BREATHING LIFE INTO EXPEDITIONARY DIPLOMACY
A Missing Dimension of US Security Capabilities

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BREATHING LIFE INTO EXPEDITIONARY DIPLOMACY

Key Findings

1. There are major opportunities in vulnerable countries to bolster stability and democratic transitions if there are US capabilities to take advantage of such openings.

2. This required capability would develop better strategies with a political focus for such countries along with specialist personnel—expeditionary diplomats—to concentrate on the implementation of these strategies over the longer term.

3. The US does not routinely do this. Instead we have general long-term goals and technocratic, diverse programs with limited operational goals, devoted to short-term solutions with insufficient connections between ends and means.

4. The development of strategies with a short- and long-term political focus and adequately resourced expeditionary personnel to implement them is NOT expensive.

5. Such strategies and personnel can be developed and personnel recruited, trained, and deployed to US missions in selected countries in less than three years from the decision to do so.


7. Expeditionary personnel would serve longer-than-usual overseas assignments in the harder places often under difficult conditions with greater risk. Such personnel will need a career path upward along with commensurate recognition and hardship compensation.

8. Expeditionary diplomats would operate under different risk management rather than current risk adverse security rules in order to develop the contacts and relationships necessary to impact country outcomes.

9. There is a pool of motivated civilian and military personnel, in and out of active service, with experience in vulnerable countries who can and would like to do this work. What remains is to recruit, train, and deploy them.

10. Expeditionary diplomats would significantly upgrade US capabilities and would bolster considerably the ability to shape the environment to enhance US security interests – but is not intended as a panacea.
“Rufus Phillips' paper is important because it recognizes that the US must compete on multiple 'battlegrounds' to secure its vital interests and those of its key allies and partners. National security decision-makers are often confronted with a false choice between military intervention and passivity. We have today an opportunity to compete more effectively in a way that clarifies our intentions, counters adversary propaganda, reassures our friends, and exposes the hypocrisy, subversive activities, and criminality of our adversaries.”

Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster  
Deputy Commanding General, Futures/Director Army Capabilities Integration Center

“Rufus Phillips makes an important contribution to the conversation about how American diplomacy has changed to meet today’s threats and how much more can still be done. He honors those diplomats serving in hard places and offers ideas on how to build on their experiences to recruit, train, and then deploy under ambassadorial authority an “expeditionary” capability to promote US interests . . . the team Secretary Kerry has tasked to update the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review should carefully consider Mr. Phillip’s report.”

Ambassador Marc Grossman  
former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

“This proposal sets out a convincing case for the creation of a much needed capability within the US government for formulating and executing political strategy. This could pay significant dividends from a modest investment across a range of countries. Phillips provides a clear and comprehensive analysis of what it would take, focusing at the practical level on the kind of individuals and qualifying characteristics required, and the training and support they would need.”

Clare Lockhart  
Director and Founder, Institute for State Effectiveness

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BREATHING LIFE INTO EXPEDITIONARY DIPLOMACY: A Missing Dimension of US Security Capabilities

INTRODUCTION

The National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) has been engaged for some time in examining critical gaps in the US national security capabilities. This research has taken into account the changing character of the foreign threats and challenges that the US has faced since the end of the Cold War. At present, the US is involved in a protracted competition on multiple fronts and with a diversity of adversaries who are opposed to the US and hostile to the core democratic principles that we share along with many of our allies and other actors worldwide. These adversaries include established regimes, such as the one now ruling in Iran, as well as revolutionary and insurgent movements like al-Qaeda and other subnational actors, such as the narcocriminal networks in the greater Atlantic Basin. The operational reach and ambitions of many of these adversaries are transnational; they threaten US security at home as well as our foreign interests, including the security and stability of our alliances as well as politically fragile states. Moreover, these adversaries are opportunistic, and the threats they pose are compounded by their demonstrated will and capacity to exploit political vacuums in vulnerable states in order to advance their own agendas.

One of the most important gaps in the US capacity to meet these challenges is the lack of a specially trained and adequately resourced expeditionary diplomatic capability with political action skills.1 Such a capability would be designed to provide needed support for US stabilization and democratic transition efforts in vulnerable states. An initial NSIC working paper, Fostering Positive Political Change: The Key to Stabilizing Vulnerable States (2013), explained the concept and the rationale for such a capability. This paper also proposed that a special force of trained expeditionary personnel be created within the US government and that a separate personnel category be established to provide a career path upwards.

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1 The term “expeditionary” is used as it is generally understood to mean service abroad in difficult environments (without the connotation of being time limited). The term “political action” means a set of activities and actions that support, influence, and shape political outcomes. (Also defined as a capability, an operational tool, and a set of techniques and actions designed to achieve political ends).
In vulnerable and contested countries, such an expeditiory diplomatic capability would be deployed for the purposes of bolstering those actors, ideas and forces that support a stable and evolving democratic future and that are attempting to prevail in the struggle over ideas and systems of governance. It would supplement not replace traditional diplomacy in situations where more active and longer term direct engagement is needed. It would go beyond the valuable shorter term efforts and specific problem driven responses now being provided by State’s Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).

A political approach would be clearly focused on advancing and defending US national interests. The work of expeditionary personnel would be overt but handled in a confidential manner. They would be volunteers willing to serve longer than usual overseas deployments in the hard places, under difficult conditions with greater than normal risk. Their role would be to serve as trusted political advisors, catalysts, coaches, and partners in fostering stability and positive political change, including the development of reasonably stable governments with viable institutions and a popular base of support. In that capacity they would work directly for US chiefs of mission in selected vulnerable countries.

The approach taken in this paper is designed to increase our chances of success in dealing with the stabilization and transition of post-revolutionary, fragile or vulnerable states. It is designed to support and enhance US effectiveness primarily under circumstances of a relatively limited US civil-military assistance footprint. Large-scale interventions involving our and other allied armed forces would require similar talents but on a much larger scale.

This working paper considers the various steps that need to be taken to develop and implement the concept of an enhanced US expeditionary diplomatic capability to engage primarily in overt political action. The paper begins with a look at past models of successful expeditionary political action practitioners, and considers how candidates for the proposed US capability would be identified and screened, followed by ideas on the recruitment and assessment of candidates for the expeditionary capability. The missions and roles which future expeditionary teams would be expected to fulfill once they are trained and assigned to the field will guide the overall education and training of expeditionary diplomats. These basic missions and roles are illustrated by relevant examples, many of which come from recent documented experiences under a variety of circumstances as well as from the more distant but still applicable past.

A model basic education and training program for expeditionary diplomats, including the topics, knowledge and skills to be transmitted as well as its learning objectives is described, as well as a shorter orientation program for chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission who will supervise expeditionary
teams in the field. This includes the recruitment of “faculty” for the basic training course. This is followed by a section on the management and administration of expeditionary personnel, including the provision of an operational fund for team operations overseas within Country Missions. There is also a target estimate of the initial size of an expeditionary political action group and its supporting staff as well as order-of-magnitude estimates of possible training and operating costs, including deployments overseas over an initial two year period.

To provide a sense of how a team of expeditionary diplomats might go about conducting its work, a notional, prototypical vulnerable state is described in Appendix A. This appendix then presents an illustrative political strategy along with some initial actions that an expeditionary team could implement in pursuit of fostering stability and the beginnings of democratic transition. Appendix B contains a breakdown of the preliminary budget estimate for recruiting, screening, training, assigning, managing, and operating a special expeditionary diplomatic force over a two-year period.

Some insist that helping transition to democracy is a futile, even counterproductive, activity in countries with no prior democratic experience. Such opinions have gained strength in recent times, and are often related to what are seen as a failure to foster democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the regression in Egypt. On the other hand, these critics fail to offer feasible political alternatives to basic democratic governance for lasting stability and for securing US security interests in an enduring fashion. What is needed is a longer term perspective, and understanding that progress towards democracy in countries with little experience in it, or an inadequate public sense of pluralism, is a zig-zag process—sometimes one step forward and two back—likely to take considerable time and patience.

As viewed in the context of this paper, the orientation towards an ultimately democratic outcome for vulnerable countries is neither Pollyannaish or a case of misapplied American exceptionalist thinking. Nor is there any thinking that free elections alone deliver democracy when they can, depending on the circumstances, exacerbate ethnic and sectarian as well as religious versus secular differences and actually set back democratic progress. Every approach has to be tailored to the circumstances of the particular country in question. Long-term transitions to democracy requires a degree of security and stability first but without proper security force attitudes which represent basic democratic values, security and stability are unlikely to endure. Protecting the safety and promoting the welfare of the population is, for example, a key tenet of successfully countering insurgencies. It is also a democratic value. The same goes in general for the way leaders and governments with professed democratic aspirations need to view, interact and respond to their people if stability is to last. The purpose of an expeditionary diplomatic capability is to identify actual and potential
opportunities for positive political change in vulnerable and contested states, to proactively take advantage of these opportunities in a sustained fashion and to promote in a competitive environment a more secure and enduring democratic order over time.

Considering whether to undertake the creation, special training and multi-year deployment of a force of expeditionary diplomatic personnel to vulnerable states, raises the question of how much value this would add to our current stabilization and transition assistance efforts. Among the reasons why the US should make such a determined effort to significantly enhance our expeditionary diplomatic and political action capabilities are the following.

The outcome of the struggle to stabilize such states and set them on an enduring road to democratic stability will remain an important national security goal of the US for years to come. The link between terrorism and countries with security and political vacuums will continue. The political side of stability, if it malfunctions, will likely erase most if not all of the progress made in other lines of endeavor such as security, governance, economic and social development and the Rule of Law. The US approach to date has tended to be mainly technocratic and insufficiently guided by a workable political strategy and approach. If carried on mainly in this vein the US may well continue to suffer setbacks from failing to address the political factors upon which enduring stability depends.

US NGOs will continue to play an effective role, particularly in the technical capacity building aspects of democratic transition. However, they are not equipped to assume official US responsibilities for creating political strategies or for undertaking a direct advisory role in strategy execution. US overseas mission civilian personnel, severely limited in their outside contacts by risk adverse security rules, are unlikely to be prepared for, or capable of, assuming the more engaged operational role required. (It is intended that expeditionary personnel would operate under different risk management rules in order to facilitate trusted working relationships with indigenous leaders indispensable for inducing positive political change.)

The proposed expeditionary teams, cross-trained in the most important aspects of stability operations, would be knowledgeable about and understand the importance of security as an imperative for achieving stability and democratic transitions. Team members would be able to forge solid US civil-military relationships as well as with other involved US agencies. They could provide valuable assistance to chiefs of mission in helping foster and coordinate effective US interagency teamwork and teamwork with other friendly missions. The proposed expeditionary capability, at relatively low cost, could also offer the opportunity of heading off vulnerable state crises so threatening to US security interests that a future more massive intervention might become necessary—with all its complications and costs.
Finally, this proposal for the creation of a specially trained group of expeditionary diplomats to serve under US chiefs of mission in selected unstable countries is not to be considered a panacea for overcoming all stabilization and transition obstacles. There are in-country situations so tenuous that political progress may be extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve, at least for the time being. Fielding teams of trained expeditionary diplomats on longer term assignments would significantly upgrade US capabilities to induce positive political change, but is not intended as a cure all.

SCREENING FOR EXPEDITIONARY PERSONNEL

A US expeditionary capability requires personnel who are capable of earning the trust and confidence of the indigenous leaders, movements and other political actors whom they will be trying to help. How well they succeed is heavily dependent on their ability to understand the local political and competitive environment, to develop meaningful personal relationships with people whose culture can be markedly different, and to think and work operationally and dynamically, not statically. To identify such personnel, it is useful to consider past experience for models of successful political action practitioners.

Two such individuals—T.E. Lawrence and Edward G. Lansdale—come most readily to mind. Both were individuals with unusual gifts of political imagination as well as the ability to quickly earn the trust of foreign political leaders. Both men were able to influence these leaders to an extraordinary extent without these leaders recognizing the complete extent of that influence. They had the capacity to insinuate to these leaders sound and actionable political advice and ideas which the recipients accepted as their own. Each of these men, however, operated under considerably different circumstances with somewhat different missions.

During World War I, Lawrence was something of a lone wolf. He worked in isolation from British Army headquarters in Cairo, directly with Bedouin tribes organizing a revolt in the Arabian Peninsula against the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Lansdale worked directly with national leaders, movements and imperfect governments in Asia within a context of trying to defeat communist rural-based insurgencies while creating stable regimes based on popular support. He had to work under the supervision of on-site US ambassadors (mission chiefs); therefore, he needed their

In determining the most desirable characteristics of an expeditionary officer, the writer’s direct political action experience plus an examination of past exceptional practitioners was used. Also useful was the identification by other professionals of the personal qualities considered necessary for successful advisory work abroad. See, for example, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Academy for International Conflict Management and Peace-building online course: “Fundamentals of Strategic Advising in Reform Environments.”
support for his political action activities to be successful. Lawrence was on his own for weeks in the Arabian Desert without timely communications, thus largely removed from direct supervision. (To be noted is the length of time each was directly involved. In Lansdale’s case he spent four years in the Philippines and two and half years in early South Vietnam. As a military officer, Lawrence spent four years in the theater, two of them on the ground in Arabia. He preceded that by participating in two pre-war civilian expeditions to the area and becoming fluent in Arabic.)

Lawrence was not merely a successful military advisor in irregular warfare but a political operative who helped mediate and foster unity and common cause among the various tribes in Arabia. His prescriptions for how others assigned to help such an effort among the Bedouin could be successful were printed in 1917 in Cairo in the Arab Bulletin as “Twenty-seven Articles.” Many of Lawrence’s prescriptions are still relevant to the conduct of political action today—for example, the need to listen and learn, and to advise indirectly. Lawrence taught that the ideal positioning of an advisor was to be present, but not noticed. Indeed, to be seen as too intimate or too prominent was to be avoided at all costs. “Better the people you are helping do it tolerably than you do it perfectly,” he urged; “it is their struggle and you are there to help them not do it for them.” Above all, he instructed it was necessary for officers serving as advisors to get to know the people and to delve deeply into the culture and language of the countries in which they operate—a task that requires great patience and persistence. “Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it.”

Because of Lansdale’s CIA security pledge and reluctance to blow his own horn at the expense of the independent image of the Asian leaders he had helped, he never wrote much directly about exactly how he did things. Moreover, his mission was different in scope and intent from Lawrence’s. In both the Philippines and Vietnam, Lansdale was charged with helping indigenous leaders and their governments save their countries from Communist take-overs. To accomplish this, his strategy was to make basic democratic ideas and governance work as a political alternative. This was initially successful in both countries, but later went off course in Vietnam.

In outlining his basic approach, Lansdale did give advice to other Americans in plain language about how to be effective in helping people in other countries. One pertinent passage directed at American military officers went as follows:

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3 T. E. Lawrence, “Twenty-seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, Cairo, 1917. This was a restricted publication for internal British Army officer consumption produced by the Cairo office of British military intelligence.
Above all, accord your fellow man with the dignity which is his birthright. In giving advice, be a true brother officer. Empathy—sympathetic understanding of the problems, needs and feelings of others—is the priceless asset you need for your work abroad. It is far more valuable than mechanically learning a foreign language or taking a course in “human communications.” Pass along your ideas in the constant spirit of wanting to help others help themselves. Do so with humility. Do not discredit the authority of those you are trying to help by advising or criticizing in front of others. Earn the privilege of advising them in private as a friend who is welcome, whose advice is worth heeding. You will find it richly rewarding in terms of human affection when you treat others the way you expect to be treated yourself.4

Lansdale was portrayed by some in the US press as flamboyant, but in dealing with indigenous leaders and cultures, he was quite the opposite. The above quote gives an accurate picture of how he conducted himself. What Lansdale taught by example was that Americans of more than average intelligence, empathy and intuition and with the right orientation and preparation could be reasonably effective at political action.5

The efforts of retired Ambassador James Bullington in Senegal represent a more recent model of effective expeditionary diplomacy (although his particular mission was on a smaller scale than is the general focus of this working paper). In 2012, Bullington was called back into active service by the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) to help resolve a thirty-year old political and insurgent conflict between the Senegalese government and its Casamance region. Casamance, in the southernmost part of Senegal, is substantially cut off from the rest of the country by the finger-like intrusion of another country, Gambia. Resolution of this conflict, which caused thousands of casualties and created tens of thousands of refugees, was considered critical to democratic stability in Senegal (which is 94 percent Muslim, and bordering on Mali to the West).

While Bullington had never served in Senegal, he had been chief of mission in Benin, deputy chief of mission in Chad, and Peace Corps Director in Niger. He understood the culture and spoke French. In 2012, the newly elected Senegalese President, Macky Sall, had run on a platform of achieving peace with the Casamance and was open to US mediation.

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5 These observations come from the writer’s direct experience working for Lansdale in a political action context from 1954 through 1956, from having run a decentralized pacification advisory team in 1962 and 1963 and afterwards from returning to political action during the 1965 to 1968 period in Vietnam. See Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2008).
Bullington’s proactive capabilities had been fostered by his early service as a CORDS pacification advisor in Vietnam. In the Casamance situation, he became a facilitator, coach, advisor, partner, and “personal trainer” as he describes it. By having earned the good faith of both sides, he was able to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations involving the Senegalese government and three different armed rebel factions. A cease-fire has held, prisoners have been exchanged and final negotiations are underway. Through this, the way was cleared for mobilizing resources by foreign donors, the World Bank and the Senegalese government to address the region’s underlying grievances, due primarily to its isolation. This includes a bridge over the Gambia River with a 2015 completion date that will provide an adequate link for the region to connect with the outside. While not finally resolved, the dispute appears well on the way to that end. Bullington served in Senegal for about a year. To support the intervention, a sum of $1 million from Defense Department Section 1207 (Security and Stabilization) funds was transferred to the State Department.6

**OSS and SOF Personnel Screening**

In developing an expeditionary diplomacy capability, it is useful to consider past and current screening efforts for special services to identify some general guidelines for screening and recruiting new personnel. During WWII in 1943, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) became concerned that a significant number of overseas operatives were having difficulty adjusting to the danger and stress required by OSS operations; some were operational disasters. As a result, the first psychological assessment program and assessment centers ever created by the US government belonged to the OSS. From 1943 until the end of the war, over five thousand OSS operatives were screened and evaluated before acceptance into service.7

The OSS assessment process took three and a half days of intensive interviews, psychological tests, and situation tests under close observation and peer review. The main variables measured for general assessment and qualification were an individual’s motivation for assignment, energy and initiative, effective intelligence, emotional stability, social relations, security and leadership. Based on the specific nature of the proposed assignment three additional variables were measured: physical ability, observing and reporting skills, and propaganda skills.8 In an after-action appraisal, the core

6 US Department of State, State Magazine, April 2013, p. 26. Additional details were taken from an exchange of e-mails between the author and the retired Ambassador Bullington, except for the rationale given for the ambassador’s success, which is the author’s informed opinion. Ambassador Bullington modestly does not blow his own horn.
7 Donald W. MacKinnon, “How Assessment Centers were started in the United States: The OSS Assessment Program, (Pittsburgh, Development Directions International 1974), 1.
variables of intelligence, motivation and leadership were found to be the most important predictors of successful performance.\(^9\)

Currently, US Special Operations Forces (SOF) use a similar assessment approach, with a focus on measuring character, commitment, and the application of acumen under the pressure of combat. The existing competitive selection process in conjunction with technical training and education is designed to produce SOF operators who are, in its words, adaptable, culturally aware, innovative, mature, self-assured, and self-reliant. The period of assessment and evaluation extends for twenty-four days, with a considerable emphasis on basic combat skills, physical endurance, and judgment under the stress of simulated combat conditions.\(^10\)

OSS and current SOF assessments were and are designed to weed out candidates who because of their psychological make-up and actions under stress are not suitable for this type of service. This was and remains primarily a screening-out process. The CIA, taking a page from the OSS model, has its own screening process for operational personnel, which serves a similar purpose.

**Important Characteristics of the Ideal Political Action Candidate**

While the mission of the proposed political action teams is different, some OSS and SOF screening criteria, particularly those related to intelligence, motivation and situational awareness remain relevant. The experiences of outstanding practitioners as previously cited also offers guidance.

The countries in which potential expeditionary personnel will serve will be politically unstable and deeply contested. Typically, these countries will lack experienced leaders and their government institutions may be nonexistent or barely functional. Moreover, their security forces will be less than effective, possibly also corrupt, and will likely be facing growing criminal and insurgent challenges, both actual and potential. These realities will compound the already substantial difficulties involved in fostering positive and democratic political change in countries with little experience with democracy. Taken together, this is liable to become enormously frustrating for expeditionary personnel. Given the foregoing, the most desirable personal characteristics to be sought in prospective expeditionary personnel in probable order of importance include:

- Practical or applied intelligence, which assumes not only a reasonably high IQ, but more importantly, the ability to use intelligence in solving “real world” problems. Mental effectiveness under stressful and highly ambiguous conditions is particularly important.

\(^9\) Ibid, 431.

• Strong motivation and an unselfish devotion to duty are both needed as a foundation for patience and perseverance in this line of work. Motivation also helps, in the words of one practitioner, to see opportunities where others see only problems, and this also enhances a person’s ability to endure mental stress.

• Effective political skills are also essential, including the capacity to think politically and to do so in a strategic fashion. This requires the faculty of political imagination, as well as the capacity to identify opportunities and devise the operational plans needed to shape political outcomes in a competitive, dynamic, and fast-moving atmosphere.

• Emotional stability is also required. This involves not suppressing one’s emotions but controlling undesirable or inappropriate emotions and not allowing them to affect one’s judgment or performance in stressful operating environments. In this, a sense of humor and an ability to “keep one’s cool” is particularly important.

• Well-developed social skills are also needed, including the ability to establish personal relationships and to work well with others while earning their trust and confidence. This requires personal openness as well as a generally positive disposition toward others, particularly those from a different culture. Genuine friendliness and also likeability is an important if sometimes underrated asset.

• The ability to communicate clearly both verbally and in writing is also necessary. This includes the capacity of persuasion, and the ability to transmit and insinuate practical ideas to others about basic democracy and about how to solve political problems in ways that are compatible with the local people and their culture.

• Leadership is also a must, including the willingness to accept responsibility, the ability to foster teamwork and work well with others, and the ability to plan and organize and to take the initiative in social situations without being overassertive.

• The capability to learn and to communicate effectively in foreign languages will also be needed for most expeditionary assignments, although there may be exceptions to this.

Undesirable Characteristics

Given the nature and rigors of an expeditionary officer’s missions and roles, a number of undesirable personal characteristics may also be grounds for not accepting candidates, including the following:

• Evidence of cultural insensitivity and negative reactions to differences of race, religion, and societal views.

• Unbalanced egotism, including ingrained attitudes of superiority, perfectionism and of the compulsion to feel comfortable and confident only if one is in control, is clearly undesirable.
• A lack of emotional stability under stress, including undue anxiety.
• Moreover, a lack of practical intelligence and perception, as well as unsound motivation and an inability to work cooperatively with others.
• Egocentric qualities of measuring self-worth based on one’s rank or position, an inability to listen and to understand to what does not fit one’s preconceptions, and an over-degree of indecisiveness when no course of action is ideal.
• Ingrained negative attitudes towards military-civilian and interagency teamwork.

RECRUITING EXPEDITIONARY PERSONNEL

Potential Sources

One of the main sources of recruits for the proposed expeditionary service will likely be US government personnel—both military and civilians—who have already performed successfully in advisory roles in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of indigenous governance and security efforts at the local and regional levels. Candidates may have acquired comparable experience serving as advisors in conflict-affected countries such as Colombia, South Sudan, and Liberia, among others. Recruits may come from within the Departments of State and Defense, and also from USAID, the CIA, and other government agencies provided they have developed useful skills and acquired relevant on-the-ground experience.

Expeditionary service should be equally open to women as well as men. Prototypes for recruits from within the government would be people with character traits and experiences similar to those of State Department contractor Carter Malkasian in Garmser District in Helmand Province, Afghanistan and SOF Major Fernando Lujan, also in Afghanistan. Both have been cited as having exhibited an extraordinary degree of political skill and cultural sensitivity in inserting themselves into the Afghan political, military, and administrative bloodstream with influential effect. Malkasian also writes about other US officials—military and civilian—who displayed an exceptional capability

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11 In Afghanistan, which is a deeply Muslim country, experience has shown Western women have sometimes been better at influencing Afghan men who tend to view them in a noncompetitive way and as a kind of third gender. They also have direct access to Afghan women which foreign men do not. The effectiveness of skilled women in expeditionary roles in almost all countries may be considerably greater than generally realized.
for exerting influence with positive security and political effects. This could include those who have served effectively in Provincial Reconstruction Teams or who have worked as advisors with local populations and leaders. An additional source from within government would be young Foreign Service officers who have the personal characteristics required and who would see a career in expeditionary diplomacy as particularly appealing.

It will be important to facilitate lateral entry into the expeditionary service by skilled active duty military, civilians, as well as qualified contract personnel. This presumes parent services will recognize the benefits of having their personnel serve in the civilian expeditionary service and that such service will not hinder a candidate’s opportunities for future promotion. Once active-duty military officers with expeditionary experience join the reserve, they could potentially comprise a reservoir of expeditionary personnel that could be called up for active duty in larger-scale involvements. Moreover, given the coming overall Defense budget reduction, Army and Marine Corps officers at the field grade level with direct political and military advisory experience in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to become available as potential recruits as they muster out of service.

Outside of government, international NGOs whose work in vulnerable countries goes beyond technical institution-building and promoting democracy at arm’s length could also be potential sources of recruits. Candidates whose NGO assignments and actions have involved them closely with political leaders and populations in vulnerable countries will have acquired experience that may have prepared them for the expeditionary service. Other possible sources consist of past Peace Corps volunteers who have worked directly with indigenous communities and leaders, or those with experience in private business and partnership with foreign firms.

Taking a broader look, the US private sector has a potentially large number of prospective recruits with native talent and deep experience in community and political organizing, and in political communication and mobilization. Moreover, bilingual immigrants who are now US citizens (and can pass security requirements) and Americans who have grown up abroad have been involved with local populations, and/or who have language skills may all be potential recruits. Some candidates could qualify for consideration because of exceptional personal qualities even though their overseas experience may be lacking. If accepted, such recruits would naturally require additional education in US government organization and foreign operations.

Of course, all candidates from outside the government will require security clearances if they are to join the expeditionary service. For such candidates, a shorter and less interactive initial screening process focused mainly on interviews and psychological testing as well as tests for cultural adaptability could be devised. This would permit the process of obtaining security clearances to be
initiated early. In any case, such recruits, given the time consumed by obtaining security clearances, would likely become part of subsequent classes of candidates.

**The Recruitment Process**

When the official announcement is made that an expeditionary service is being created, organized, and trained, it should be as low-key as possible and follow standard government procedures for publication and circulation. Sensationalizing this form of service could easily happen, and it is critical to avoid this. The call for volunteers should explain what the force is being recruited to do and describe the assessment process as well as the education and training program. It should also explain some of the rewards and challenges posed by such service. To interest the private sector, the creation of an expeditionary force could be announced through the press and elsewhere, though this should be done in sober and not exaggerated terms.

**Assessing Recruits**

As recruitment begins, it will be important to implement an intensive assessment process that would, at a minimum, screen out unacceptable candidates. Typically, this process would give weight to prior relevant experience and positive indications from intensive interviews and testing. At the same time, a well-tuned assessment process could also be used to screen-in candidates who are not as experienced. While detecting undesirable characteristics, the assessment process should attempt to evaluate the whole person. This would be particularly useful for candidates who have experience working effectively abroad with local people but not directly in US government advisory efforts.

The assessment period should last for no more than four to five days. The first two days would entail in-depth interviews to assess a candidate’s character and personality traits as well as psychological written and verbal tests. The remainder of the time would be taken up by situational testing of the recruits under close observation and peer review. There are, in fact, a variety of psychological tests available, some of which are used by the SOF. Psychologists would be asked to evaluate the utility of the variety of available tests and to recommend an optimal testing regime.

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13 Currently, SOF uses the Minnesota Multi-phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) to provide a general picture of dominant personality characteristics and particularly to identify candidates with abnormal personality symptoms. SOF also uses the Wonderlic Personnel Test to measure intelligence and problem solving aptitude. The General Ability Measure for Adults (GAMA) is used to measure nonverbal intelligence and aptitude. Basic language capability is measured by the Defense Language Aptitude Battery or the Defense Language Aptitude Test. The Foreign Service Institute also conducts language aptitude tests. In addition, there is a battery of other tests available for psychological screening. These include among others the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (KTS), the Temperament and Character
Situational testing, a key part of the assessment process, would consist mainly of what psychologists refer to as “projective tests.” In such tests, a person is given a relatively unstructured task to perform, and asked to respond either in writing, verbally, or sometimes in a play-acting situation. Such tests permit an almost unlimited variety of possible responses, which are then measured and assessed. The most valuable techniques likely involve sentence completion tests and improvisations, or modified psychodrama. The sentence completion measure asks a person to complete a half-written sentence such as “I admire __,” or “I am most afraid of __.” The second method involving improvisation is to provide a group of candidates a problem and ask them to solve it among themselves. They would solve it with and in front of other candidates who then discuss what occurred.14

Similar tests were conducted by the OSS. Individuals were assigned to groups to perform a specific task during which leadership ability, situational awareness, social skills, and emotional balance could be tested. A candidate’s teammates involved in the test could be deliberately uncooperative or one teammate might subtly sabotage the project to test candidate alertness and situational awareness.

At the conclusion of the assessment, candidates would be evaluated individually. To ensure that personnel records do not reflect these assessments, they would remain tightly controlled with no outside circulation and highly restricted within the organization. All candidates should be allowed to withdraw for “personal reasons” from further consideration without any record of participation being recorded in their personnel files. Additional measures would be taken within the organization to limit access to this information.

In the selection process, it is suggested that the following screening scale be used: 1) Highly recommended, 2) Recommended, 3) Recommended with qualifications, 4) Doubtful; 5) Not recommended.15 It is further suggested that the final decision about whether to accept a candidate for the basic training course be made by the director of the expeditionary group.

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MISSIONS AND ROLES OF AN EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY

In developing an expeditionary capability and a basic training course for future expeditionary personnel it is necessary first to define missions and roles. The overall mission of an expeditionary force is to foster positive political change and development in vulnerable states over a longer-term basis. The role of expeditionary officers is to serve as advisors, catalysts, partners, and coaches for positive political change in vulnerable countries facing a variety of challenges. These officers will be expected to work with indigenous partners as well as cooperatively with their colleagues in the US mission to influence political outcomes across a variety of stability sectors, including governance, security, civil society, economic and social development, and the Rule of Law. They will also work with in-country allies, with NGOs, and with UN missions depending on their capabilities and degree of involvement.

Expeditionary personnel must be equipped with a deep knowledge of their assigned country, and the ability to think and to act politically and strategically. The training program, which is subsequently described herein, must provide candidates with an understanding of the key roles they will be expected to play and the missions they are expected to undertake. They must be provided with the knowledge and skills they will need to successfully carry out their endeavors. In carrying out the missions described below, it should be understood that success will depend on many factors but particularly on the varying circumstances of each country and its leaders. There is no magic bullet for this type of work and ultimate success will also depend to a considerable extent on US patience and persistence over time.

1. Understand the in-country competitive environment

Effective expeditionary diplomacy or political action in vulnerable countries requires a deep understanding of the indigenous political environment, including its national and subnational leaders, its main political movements and causes, and the ideas, fears, and aspirations that drive political life. Moreover, it requires an understanding of the broader competitive environment, including the strengths and weakness of those who undermine stability and oppose democratic change, as well as the opportunities, both actual and potential, to foster stabilization and transitions toward democratic self-government.

Expeditionary officers must have the ability to collect and to analyze the kinds of information that will be essential to fulfilling their role of helping shape positive political outcomes. They will
inevitably learn some necessary information from pre-deployment education about a particular country’s culture and history. However, such knowledge is likely to be fragmentary, and may be of limited use as a base for political strategy and action once deployed in the field. Washington and local embassy background information and files are prone to be incomplete because intelligence targeting has been incomplete. Information gathering guidelines from the US government may be useful as a compendium of the various kinds of information needed, although its current focus may be more technical than political.16

Moreover, in countries that are facing a situation of insurgency, existing governmental information is likely to be more “enemy-centric” than “population-centric.” Thus it may lack focus on the important societal and governance trends in a given country that expeditionary personnel need to know. For example, in early 2010, Major General Michael Flynn, the ISAF intelligence chief in Afghanistan, pointed out that intelligence gathering activities in the country had focused almost exclusively on the Taliban. At the same time, these activities did not focus on collecting vital information about the population, local leaders, and conditions that would be needed to be effective in persuading such leaders, security forces, and government officials to work together to maintain public security and deliver government services.17 In essence, the US was not asking the kinds of questions upon which political and security success from the ground up ultimately depended.

Failure to ask the right questions and fully understand the local political situation can have disastrous consequences. This was the case in Somalia in 1993 when US and UNOSOM II officials erroneously believed they could weaken and intimidate the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and General Aideed by attacking them directly with air and ground forces. Particularly fateful was an attack by helicopter gunships on a meeting of SNA leaders, tribal sub-clan elders, and religious leaders being held to consider resuming a dialogue with UNOSOM II. Aideed, likely the principal target, was not there, having been called away for another meeting. The attack, which had been endorsed by local civilian and military officials and approved by the White House, was the first made on people rather than on military targets. Most of the attendees including religious leaders and tribal elders were killed or badly wounded. The attack strengthened rather than weakened Aideed politically and animated the heretofore mainly quiescent Somali population to kill Americans. It led to the “Black Hawk Down” firefight in which an estimated 1000 Somali men, women and children were killed or wounded in suicidal attacks on US Rangers. The US casualties—18 killed and 75

16 See “Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework” (ICAF), 2008. and the “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” 2007, both produced by interagency task forces under the auspices of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), now named the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).

wounded—greatly intensified US domestic opposition and ultimately prompted a complete American withdrawal.\textsuperscript{18}

Since 9/11 if not earlier, US efforts to foster democratic stabilization and democratic transitions in vulnerable countries have too often lacked a political focus. The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, for example, initially lacked a viable political strategy for creating a new national compact among the country’s contending factions. Moreover, US military assistance to vulnerable countries has frequently focused all too narrowly on the “technical” dimensions of security, such as the training and equipping of security forces, without considering its political dimensions. Such was clearly the case recently in Mali, where a military coup resulting from miserable conditions in the army caught the US by surprise. It is interesting to note that the Afghan army chief of staff, when asked the reason in 2012 for insider attacks by Afghan soldiers on ISAF forces, said about his own troops, “They don’t know why we are fighting.”\textsuperscript{19}

As has been pointed out, the US does not systematically collect and analyze the types of information that would help us understand the “competitive” political environment in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{20} Information about the diversity of political forces in a foreign society as well the make-up and internal dynamics of the security services, civil society, business and labor sector, and religious leadership is rarely a focus of our attention. While prominent government leaders may be profiled, their principal advisors and confidants are typically not. Moreover, information that would be useful for expeditionary advisors—for example, about a politician’s personality characteristics and family relations—are rarely a focus.

To fill information gaps, expeditionary officers will need to gather critical and politically relevant information once they are deployed. This includes understanding not only the economic and social interests of different groups and individuals, but also their political aspirations, desires, what they value and what they honor. Edward Lansdale offered the following insight into the kinds of questions that are useful in formulating successful political strategy:

What are the best ways of winning the friendship and trust of the people in this country? What manners, actions and symbols cause their mistrust and enmity? What are current popular notions of humor, morals and good taste? What specific factors contribute most

\textsuperscript{20} Nadia Schadlow, “Upgrading America’s Influence,” Orbis, Vol 57, Number 4, Fall 2013, 501-515.
to national pride? What is the popular concept of the more important events in the history of the country? Who are the national heroes? 21

Likewise, expeditionary personnel will need to be prepared with the right kinds of questions to ask for the purposes of developing trusting working relationships as well as political strategies. Expeditionary officers are likely to arrive at a post in a foreign country with a general set of political goals and a basic political strategy. In all likelihood, this strategy will have been drawn up in Washington and on the basis of incomplete information. In such cases, an expeditionary officer must begin his or her work in-country with a realistic on-site appraisal based on more targeted questioning that will help in adjusting strategy and its implementation.

As such, expeditionary team members will need to learn how to gather and assess information that is relevant and useful to their advisory role and mission of fostering positive political change. They will need to learn how to feel their way into a foreign context and its unique mix of political issues, leaders, movements, and causes. This is most effectively done through direct contact with indigenous leaders and the population. Moreover, a sometimes untapped source of background information are American and foreign journalists with extensive in-country exposure. Many of these people are willing to talk about their impressions in informal, off-the-record settings. Another source of information can be “bridge people” who are natives of the host country but who have lived or been educated in the US and thus are capable of working alongside US officials. NGO personnel with close local connections may also be sources of insight, as could members of foreign missions who do not have a cultural bias.

2. Develop and carry out political strategies to help achieve basic democratic outcomes

For political stabilization to occur and democratic transitions to succeed both require genuine support from the wider population and their active participation. One of the roles of the expeditionary officer will be to formulate and implement strategies to foster this kind of political change. Above all, this requires the ability to think as well as to act politically. Thinking politically means conceiving of US and indigenous actions, programs, and projects in terms of their positive political effect. This also involves thinking of ways to maximize these effects psychologically.

The standard US approach to stabilization operations in vulnerable states tends to be programmatic and technical, rather than political. For example, the guiding document for achieving

21 An indicative guide is included in an unpublished 1958 paper by Lansdale called, “Cold War Intelligence Requirements – For a Contested Free World Country.” While shaped by the struggle to defeat Communist attempts at “national liberation,” it was intended with a political slant in mind for use in threatened countries.
US overseas mission objectives in countries—including vulnerable ones—is called the “Mission Strategic Resource Plan.” However, these documents generally lack any explicit political strategy component or operational plan for achieving basic political objectives.

Expeditionary officers will augment conventional capacity-building programs, but their role will not be to provide technical assistance or skills instruction such as how to run a school construction program, develop a logistics system, set up a court system, or run elections. Such skills are essential as building blocks for the creation of a durable state. Too often, however, such assistance tends to be provided in ways that are unrelated to the whole and as ends in themselves without considering their political and psychological effect.

In the early part of the Cold War, the famous diplomat George F. Kennan argued that the most important effects of a successful Marshall Plan for post-War Europe wouldn’t just be economic, but psychological and political. The strategic goal of the plan was to show that democracy could work as a political alternative to communism. Kennan’s idea for the creation of a Department for Political Warfare within the State Department to combat the rise of Soviet influence was never adopted. However, other elements in the US government were able to take specific political and psychological actions, both overt and covert, to implement a strategic political vision for strengthening Western Europe against communism. Today, Kennan’s competitive strategy approach could be updated in many vulnerable states to show that liberal democracy can be made to work as an alternative to either theocracy or autocracy.

The concept and practice of strategy is very often confused with more general statements of what are called strategic goals and priorities. Strategy is basically a set of objectives and proposed courses of action to achieve those objectives. It normally involves a description of the resources needed to carry out these actions, including a general idea of how these resources should be deployed. In short, strategy can be said to cover ends, ways, and means. In the carrying out of political strategies, a fact-based and dynamic analysis of opportunities and obstacles by expeditionary personnel will be necessary in order to achieve specific political objectives.

Lansdale’s conduct in South Vietnam in 1954-55 is an example of how expeditionary teams could develop a political strategy and foster political stability. The challenge Lansdale faced was how the US could best help the creation of an independent South Vietnam out of political chaos that was not susceptible to takeover by the Communist north and independent of French colonial control. On arrival, Lansdale immediately began meeting a wide range of Vietnamese and lower-level US

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mission personnel and journalists with Vietnamese contacts while his team (Saigon Military Mission) was organized. He probed into the state of mind of noncommunist Vietnamese leaders and the population. He quickly learned that only complete independence from the French would lend any South Vietnamese government legitimacy. There was also a critical deficit of mutual trust between noncommunist nationalist leaders. A secret French agreement with the Communist Vietminh to divide the country in two had deeply angered and discouraged the noncommunist Vietnamese. Only a few believed keeping South Vietnam out of Communist hands was possible. On the basis of these findings Lansdale began to develop his political strategy and shaping actions.

He set out to instill self-confidence in the South Vietnamese by taking some leaders to the Philippines and showing them how another independent Asian nation had succeeded in defeating a Communist insurgency. When the Vietnamese saw Filipinos clearly in charge of their own affairs, this effort also generated confidence and trust in American intentions. At the same time, Lansdale suggested specific actions that Prime Minister Diem could take to bolster popular support while helping Diem ward off a military coup and resist French behind-the-scenes attempts to remove him from office. Diem’s initiatives, which included Army civic action operations and sending civilian teams into the villages, gave rural populations tangible evidence that their government cared for them. These initiatives, in addition to military operations to defeat sectarian takeover efforts, generated population support and showed that the inexperienced and beleaguered Diem government could function against formidable odds. Among the most important effects of Lansdale’s efforts was the psychological support given to South Vietnamese morale and self-confidence.

A more contemporary example of strategic political planning happened as part of the surge in Iraq, led by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. In 2007, General Petraeus convened a group of 19 civilians and military officers, headed by then Colonel H. R. McMaster. As described by Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor in *Endgame*, “the group’s real innovation had to do with political strategy…it should try to shape the evolution of the Iraqi state.” The group tasked itself with developing an alternative strategy to simply turning over security to Iraqi forces without addressing the underlying political problems. In the course of the war, the US had established through its military officers and civilians, contacts and personal relationships with many key Iraqi actors. Using these relationships, US personnel made a concerted effort to encourage their

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23 See note 5.
Iraqi counterparts to abandon sectarianism, to make compromises with the country’s various factions, and to get the badly divided government and security forces to function. While the ultimate outcome in Iraq remains uncertain the political and military aspects of the surge resulted in greater security and national unity throughout its duration. The fact that poor Iraqi political leadership undermined the successes gained during the surge tends to confirm the notion that the US did not stay with it long enough.

The massive military presence in Iraq gave the US more potential political influence than it will likely have in future interventions. While the surge in Afghanistan has sought to replicate the military goals and approach of the Iraq surge with some success, it has never been fully integrated politically with the actions of the Department of State’s mission in Kabul. As such, the US has been hindered in its ability to address the political dimensions of the Afghan struggle.

The challenges we will likely face in the future will increasingly draw on our capacity to develop and implement effective political strategies. Ideally, Washington could develop political strategies for targeted countries by drawing on broad-based groups including outside as well as in-house experts. Until now, however, only the Defense Department has been able to undertake such a broad-based approach in specific high-priority instances, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. At present, there seems to be no Washington-based government office that is tasked with sponsoring and paying for the development of political strategies.

In the absence of this, the primary task of developing effective political strategies will generally continue to be the responsibility of US country missions. But, given the range of existing mission responsibilities and persisting staff shortages, it is unlikely that particular missions—unassisted—will be able to command the necessary resources for this purpose. Hence, the responsibility of developing a political strategy, as part of a comprehensive country strategy, should fall primarily to the expeditionary team in the field with input from other country mission elements concerned mainly with intelligence, military, and economic assistance.

3. Develop relationships of mutual trust and confidence with indigenous leaders

One of the core roles of trained expeditionary officers will be to serve as quiet partners and advisors to indigenous government and nongovernment leaders. An essential task, therefore, will be to develop relationships of mutual trust and confidence with indigenous leaders and other political actors. This task may seem obvious, but it is the foundation for carrying out all political strategy and shaping actions in vulnerable countries. As such, the training program will seek to develop in candidates the ability to influence the ways in which indigenous leaders act politically, and to induce
them to pursue constructive policies and to avoid political mistakes. The ability to exert influence at this level demands that expeditionary personnel earn the highest trust of their indigenous counterparts in the process of communicating ideas and formulating a common cause. Without trust between expeditionary officers and indigenous leaders and policymakers, the advice they try to give is unlikely to have a significant effect.

Historically, whether in politics or business, the US has been a world leader in developing techniques for establishing collegial working relationships and using such relationships in pursuit of a common goal. As a result, we assume that our diplomatic, military, and economic development personnel already understand the importance of winning the trust and confidence of foreign leaders. In the realm of foreign policy, strategy, and operations, however, US representatives too often fail to use the very interpersonal techniques that have made us so successful at home.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, there are abundant examples of US representatives misunderstanding the importance of local leaders. Such was evident in the failure of Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq (CPA) head Paul Bremer to understand the importance of forging relationships with key Iraqi leaders. Bremer rejected the assistance of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and dropped invaluable personnel from his staff, including Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Both decisions directly compromised the political efficacy of his organization. Our political failings in Iraq were also evident following the surge. Newly appointed Ambassador Christopher Hill reportedly decided that the US mission had become too involved with the Iraqis; it should therefore “un-Crocker” itself and become more of a traditional embassy. Consequently, the embassy ceased developing close working relationships with many Iraqi leaders and stopped using the "back-door" go-betweens which the US had come to rely upon under Crocker and Petraeus. The decision also produced new tension between the US civilian and military commands, since the latter had developed deeper Iraqi connections than the former and was more willing to use them to influence security and political outcomes.

Some in the US government recognize the strategic importance of politics and of building relationships of mutual trust in conflict situations. Such is evident in academic courses that the US Institute of Peace (USIP) offers to military and civilian officials at the Defense Department on how to become an effective advisor. The importance of winning people’s confidence and influencing


them, however, does not appear to be sufficiently emphasized in State Department or USAID training. Possibly there may be a fear of clientelism or “going native.” Yet these fears are misplaced if one views how principled US representatives have acted objectively in the past in such situations.

Some US missions abroad are likely to face considerable difficulties in establishing relationships of mutual trust with indigenous leaders. In many vulnerable countries, suspicions about and even hostility towards US intentions will be palpable. Therefore, the development of trusting relationships will typically take considerable time and patience. Nevertheless, expeditionary personnel can overcome such preexisting distrust with the right mix of demonstrable sincerity, perseverance and tactics. One noteworthy example is provided by the experience of foreign advisors working on Hungarian military reform after the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc. In one account of this written by a Hungarian participant, the general Hungarian desire to join NATO and the EU was a strong motivating factor in the acceptance of democratic rules and technical changes in the security sector. However, an ingrained mistrust of Western motives from 40 years of Communist rule had to be overcome. In the process, the US and European advisors assigned to facilitate reform at the top levels proved to be good listeners, and they developed personal relationships of mutual trust with key Hungarian officers and civilian leaders. This not only dispelled mistrust but resulted in a shared understanding of the goals of reform that encouraged the Hungarians to undertake necessary actions. Mutual visits between key officials and joint training exercises also helped.²⁷

Likewise, it is critical that those providing stabilization and transition assistance align their own goals with the positive aspirations of their foreign partners. Expeditionary personnel will be most able to accomplish this by understanding the traditions and history of the country they are working in and the personal convictions of its leading politicians. The efforts by US expeditionary officers to develop relationships with foreign leaders can also be assisted by those who already enjoy friendly ties with these leaders. In the early days of the Vietnam War, Lansdale had another American officer temporarily assigned to Saigon because he had established personal relationships with several Vietnamese army officers who were helping their commander plot a coup. That relationship was used as a bridge to boost Lansdale’s *bona fides* and to help defuse the coup.²⁸ Such an operation does

²⁸ Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), 172,183. Lt. Commander Larry Sharpe, who had offered the hospitality of his home to the two Vietnamese officers while they were both taking the US Army’s psychological warfare course at Ft. Bragg, was transferred to Saigon to assist Lansdale. Lansdale used Sharpe to establish his own *bona fides* with these officers as well as to insert Sharpe into the operations of the Army radio station which was attacking the South Vietnamese government. This proved influential in subverting the coup.
not necessarily depend on using Americans; reliable foreign contacts can also be used to facilitate connections with local leaders.

In building relationships, the expeditionary team leader will necessarily set the example for other team members in the way he or she handles initial contacts. The team leader will introduce him or herself to foreign counterparts, or they will have the US chief of mission make the introduction to various leaders, particularly those in government. The mission chief could introduce the leading expeditionary officer as her or his principal political assistant or advisor (and thereby avoid any confusion with the official title of the CIA station chief or the head of the political section). It could then be explained that the expeditionary officer’s mission is to learn and to serve as the mission chief’s eyes and ears. It could further be explained that the officer’s job is to acquire a deeper understanding of the political direction of the country so as to keep US policies attuned to the aspirations of the country’s leaders and people.

After initial contact is made, the team leader should aspire to convert subsequent meetings into genuine learning sessions. Along the way, actions to deepen relationships should be taken such as arranging for a particular leader’s attendance at a relevant conference abroad. If the conference is sufficiently important, the team leader could accompany the leader. Such opportunities can also be used to strengthen relationships with various government and nongovernment leaders. Moreover, once indigenous officials become more familiar with the team leader and team members, the US mission chief’s operational fund could be used to bring in special experts to help with specific projects. If, for example, US assistance is needed to support a pilot project sponsored by a particular leader (such as a model of village self-development), it could be funded by seed money from the mission chief’s operational fund. Other priority projects with a political impact could be funded on a limited, pilot basis with more regular economic assistance to follow if the project was successful and capable of expansion.

One obvious way to overcome distrust of US intentions and earn the confidence of indigenous leaders is by assisting them to govern effectively and responsively. For example, opportunities may come up to support actions by indigenous governments that serve not only humanitarian ends but also have beneficial political and psychological implications. This could include supporting rapid governmental responses to natural disasters as well as to other concrete problems where government-led intervention is likely to rectify the situation.

Furthermore, popular political causes, leaders, and movements often arise as a specific reaction to a range of social issues and scenarios, from rampant corruption, to the lack of adequate justice in the legal system, to public insecurity. If governments fail to respond to these issues adequately they can
generate political crises. But by addressing legitimate public grievances, weak governments can win popular support and acquire greater legitimacy. As such, expeditionary officers should continually assess these opportunities to avert crises and effect positive political outcomes. They should encourage governments to address public grievances by suggesting practical ways for handling them. Moreover, the effectiveness of government leaders can also be augmented by tapping NGOs and other sources of external assistance.

Once a trusting relationship is established with a particularly worthy national civic or political movement and its leaders, a savvy expeditionary official can then be in a position to suggest any number of actions to increase the movement and its leaders’ influence in advancing democratically oriented political outcomes.

4. Help enable effective democratically oriented indigenous leadership

In their efforts to foster stabilization and democratic transitions, expeditionary personnel are likely to face a wide variety of political challenges and obstacles. In many if not most vulnerable countries, there may be little tradition of democratic government, little sense of pluralism in society, little effective civil society, extensive corruption, little if any Rule of Law and other conditions which are conducive to autocracy and/or continued disorder and insurgency.

An important mission for expeditionary personnel is to enable an indigenous political leadership that is effective and democratically oriented. Without such leadership, stabilization and democratic transitions are most likely to fail. In a country with an established government, political action efforts can be directed mainly but not exclusively at developing personal relationships with existing government officials to help them govern in ways that earn citizens’ trust and support. In countries where government is not well established, expeditionary officers should figure out ways to help leaders with a democratic outlook emerge into government leadership positions while also attempting to cultivate potential future leaders.

Identifying capable leaders with democratic tendencies—even in countries without much of a democratic tradition—is not necessarily difficult. But, as always, expeditionary team leaders and members will need to ask the right kinds of questions, including the following: what are a political leader’s basic beliefs and motivation? Is he patriotic and why? Does he put the basic rights and welfare of his own people ahead of his own? Does he have a following because of what he believes, and not just because of his family or position? Does he have an honest reputation?
Enabling democratic leadership is not about “picking winners.” If expeditionary officers choose this simplistic approach, it is likely to backfire and potentially undermine a leader’s independence in the eyes of the population, making him vulnerable to charges of puppetry. Leaders have to emerge on their own merit. However, those individuals who distinguish themselves for their honesty, unselfishness, and willingness to put the country and its people’s needs first are worth the investment of quiet support.

In any case, the work of cultivating and enabling democratic leaders has to be done with eyes wide open. It is critical to assess the weaknesses and flaws of all individuals and to understand how these might inhibit stabilization and democratic transitions. Some potential leaders may possess all the necessary qualities for higher office; however, these same leaders may possess other qualities that could undermine their country’s longer-term democratic prospects. Effective leaders, for instance, may have autocratic tendencies, lack interpersonal skills, and perhaps have illiberal ideas and convictions but they may be the only ones available to hold their country together. The US mission may have to support the best available leadership for the time. Meanwhile, expeditionary officers in support of the mission chief should be doing their best to help such leadership, along with its advisors and supporters, overcome flaws and personal shortcomings through continued partnership and advice.

In many vulnerable countries, the expeditionary officer’s role will be to help indigenous leaders govern more broadly and democratically by helping to forge more collaborative relationships between such leaders. Carter Malkasian, a civilian on contract with the State Department, demonstrated how to build such relationships and how to use them for constructive political and security purposes in the south of Afghanistan. A perceptive observer of the local culture and who had the persistence to learn Pashtu, he worked himself into a position of mutual trust with a diversity of local leaders who didn’t all trust each other. He was an empathetic inquisitor about local history: why had the Taliban been able to take over his particular district? Who were the important family and tribal groupings, and how had they worked or not worked together in the past? He then used this information and the personal relationships he cultivated to foster—over time and through informal mediation—a unity of purpose and action by local leaders and their supporters to oppose the Taliban.

Simultaneously, Malkasian made sure military operations being conducted by US Marine units sustained his political efforts while also helping build effective Afghan security forces. The Marines

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29 Such was the situation with Diem in Vietnam, although the case can be made that he was more persuadable by the right kind of advisor.
were able to clear Taliban forces out of the district. However, the most difficult challenge was to replace them with adequate Afghan security forces and effective governance. Malkasian convinced local leaders that they could trust him and his judgment, even though he was not a Pashtun. The degree of trust and confidence between Malkasian and his interlocutors was evidenced by the fact that he relied on the Afghans to keep him safe, not on US security personnel. The Afghans themselves believed that he had been a major contributor to eliminating Taliban domination of the district.30

The Malkasian case demonstrates how trusted foreign intermediaries can bring local leaders together who share the same political objectives but who may be divided for ethnic or religious reasons or even by past disputes. Political movements and their leaders often emerge after years of suppression by authoritarian rule or armed conflict. Politics tends to fall back on more familiar ethnic or tribal links. A shaping action to begin overcoming this may be as simple as: “would you come to a meeting with me and so and so. I have gotten to know both of you and find you have very similar beliefs. Maybe it is possible that you can find common ground to work together.”

Another example of a skilled intermediary enabling a more democratically oriented leadership is Ambassador Khalilzad’s behind-the-scenes activity in Afghanistan in 2002. He helped Afghan leaders achieve a consensus (“compact”) about the framework for a new constitution. To accomplish this, he became familiar with the principal Afghan actors, and could therefore serve as a reliable channel through which they could resolve their differences. He urged the use of the traditional Afghan form of reaching consensus through dialogue, the Loya Jirga.31 Later, in Iraq, there was no comparable traditional power-sharing institution. Nevertheless, Khalilzad still successfully developed and used personal relationships to facilitate a constructive national dialogue among Iraqi political leaders in 2003. The CPA in Iraq led by Ambassador Bremer did not take advantage of Khalilzad’s efforts and contacts, and this is unfortunate; it likely would have helped the CPA avoid political mistakes.32

Efforts to help democratically oriented leaders emerge will be unlikely to succeed without adequate follow-through. President Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador in the 1980s was a leader strongly committed to democracy in his country. While not particularly charismatic, he was steady in struggling for democratic change in the midst of an insurgency. Important elements in the country’s armed forces and civilian society continuously tried to undermine him. The US mission in El Salvador maintained a close relationship with and offered constructive advice to Duarte through

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five ambassadors. Local US representatives listened when Duarte insisted that the military had to be part of the solution and that cleansing it of death squads would take time and patience. The US mission learned from the experience that it was most effective when it stuck with the leader who has basic democratic convictions, and, who genuinely believes in the welfare and rights of his own people. The mission also worked to moderate the extreme right opposition. The US came to understand that success in such cases takes time. In this particular instance, it took almost 12 years.33

Fostering positive political change is necessarily a long-term effort (a reason for expeditionary officers to serve in-country on an extended basis). Examples of the US squandering success after supporting a flawed regime include Vietnam after 1956 and Afghanistan after 2002. Assisting effective democratic leaders in vulnerable countries is likely to take not only time but considerable patience and perseverance in maintaining positive contact and support.

5. Assist indigenous security forces to play a constructive role in democratic transitions

Adequate security is a *sine qua non* for political development and transitions to democracy to take place. One of the missions of the expeditionary team will be to assist in the effort to create security forces that are not just technically competent but that embody democratic values. Security forces are key to securing a vulnerable country, but political stabilization is unlikely to endure unless it has deep population support. For these reasons, US efforts to foster security in vulnerable states must go far beyond providing training in pure combat and technical law enforcement tactics. Security forces must become imbued with public service principles and practices that respect their own civilian population.

In many vulnerable countries, the security services tend to present major obstacles to political stabilization. They are often dysfunctional with little sense of mission and public duty beyond survival and the anticipation of the next paycheck. Some, particularly the police, may have been used as instruments of repression by the regime, and therefore face outright hostility from the very population they are supposed to protect. Moreover, internal religious and ethnic differences within the security services as well as the existence of independent militias can also present significant potential challenges to stabilization and transition.

33 Todd Greentree, *Crossroads of Intervention*, (Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2008), 83, 106-107. Greentree provides background on how the US mission maneuvered behind the scenes to keep Duarte alive politically.
The importance of security sector reform is generally understood within the US government—and particularly by the US military, since this is the principal service tasked with carrying it out. Admiral Dennis Blair has argued that our entire military establishment needs to support a mission of “influencing armed forces worldwide to support democratic transitions.” He suggests that the US military should promote—via its personal contacts and its training and exchange missions—a number of democratic norms about the role of the armed forces in a society. Drawing from his experience in influencing foreign military leaders, Adm. Blair suggests that the US military can succeed in instilling liberal values in foreign militaries by appealing to commonly shared military concepts such as legacy, honor, and the duty to protect one’s country and its people.34

American lessons from the past in inculcating "civic action attitudes" into indigenous security forces are still applicable today. In 1955, the United States supported programs aimed at influencing the attitudes and practices of the South Vietnamese army. A sole American served as the advisor to two army divisions which reoccupied a large area that the Communist Viet Minh had controlled for nine years. With US advice, the army established a training program to indoctrinate the troops to engage in civic action and to help the population. The result was an occupation operation without a single adverse incident with the population. Indeed, the Vietnamese army troops received widespread population support because of their behavior. At the same time, morale in the army improved tremendously as it became prouder of its service to the civilian population than of its prior role as combat soldiers.35

David Galula, the prominent French practitioner and theorist of counterinsurgency, describes this phenomenon in his book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Galula managed to transform a French combat parachute unit into civic action warriors. He had them protect and forge strong personal relationships with the civilian population in a particular area of Algeria. The appreciation the French soldiers received from the population motivated them to think proudly of themselves in a new way, as protectors and helpers of the people they were defending.36

In most instances, reforming security services will be a long-term process. However, it should be possible to take more immediate steps to indoctrinate civic attitudes into indigenous forces through a cooperative effort between US military and expeditionary civilian officers. As critical as it is for the US mission’s military officers to work closely with indigenous military and police leaders, lasting

security sector reform also needs active political support from the indigenous civilian leadership. In particular, expeditionary officers could play a useful role in persuading indigenous civilian leaders to become actively involved in applying democratic principles to security sector reform initiatives as well as holding the armed forces accountable to these principles. In the end, it is a country’s civilian leadership that becomes ultimately responsible for security force behavior. They should, therefore, become involved in what is taught to the security forces about their civic role.

6. Foster indigenous government actions to win popular support for more effective and democratic governance

Successful stabilization and democratic transitions are unlikely to occur without widespread popular support. As such, one mission of the expeditionary team will be to encourage governments to undertake actions and programs that clearly benefit the civilian population so as to enhance public support. This requires, first of all, a responsive governmental leadership that focuses existing state institutions or creates new ones to address some of the basic concerns, needs, and aspirations of its people. Not only do such deeds speak louder than words, but words and promises without deeds and meaningful government follow-through can significantly undermine government credibility.

Encouraging government actions that can win popular support for democratic governance will involve advising indigenous officials to pursue new initiatives and policies that serve stabilization and democratic outcomes. It will also entail helping to identify creative ways to use media to publicize these governmental initiatives so as to maximize their political and psychological effect and thereby enhance the legitimacy and appeal of democratic government.

During the Huk insurgency in the Philippines, defense department lawyers were used at Secretary Magsaysay’s direction to represent tenants in one-sided local land courts. This attempt to correct an abusive system was widely publicized through newspapers and radio news broadcasts. This sent the message that at least part of the Philippine government, which was generally regarded as corrupt at the time, cared for “the little guy” and was serious about responding to injustice. This undermined the insurgent Communist Huk claim that the existing legal system was unjust and that they were the only ones concerned over the plight of ordinary tenant farmers.

An even more imaginative idea, originated by an American advisor, was the creation of a complaint and action office within the Philippine defense department during the Huk insurgency to address government abuse. Victims of military or civil government mistreatment were able to send a five centavo telegram (a few American pennies) to the department. This generated an immediate
investigation followed by corrective action where needed and possible. Secretary of Defense Magsaysay sometimes investigated these complaints in person with no accompanying press. Soon, word of mouth spread an image of Magsaysay as a new kind of government leader who was responsive and really cared about the people. While there are few leaders like Magsaysay, this example shows how similar systems with expeditionary advice could be implemented by indigenous governments to alleviate abuse and earn popular support. Complaint and action mechanisms or some type of ombudsman system adapted to local circumstances could possibly be created in a number of vulnerable countries.

USAID and NGO support for the construction of village schools in Afghanistan is a fine example of a US effort that has had a positive political impact. In what began as a joint effort between local officials, the US Marine commander and the USAID local representative significantly increased popular support for the Afghan government in Garmser District. Similarly, in a different culture during the Vietnam War, a US-sponsored livestock-raising project that targeted the poorest farmers in South Vietnam was a highly effective part of the overall pacification program. While the US supported the effort, the Vietnamese government ran it, and received all the credit for it from the rural population. The program provided to farmers improved breeds of livestock on loan that were able to reproduce and be brought to market within a relatively short time. As a result, poor families brought in more money than they had seen for generations. The program was so psychologically successful in winning population support that the Communists tried to copy it in the North but failed.

7. Help develop citizen participation in government

The development of self-sustaining democratic government in vulnerable countries will not be achieved solely through the emergence of indigenous democratic leaders, or by building effective governmental institutions, or by holding free and fair elections. Indeed, elections can—as previously mentioned—reinforce rather than overcome ethnic, sectarian or religious divisions. What is also

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37 Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 48-49,122-124. As a result of the complaint and action process, actions were taken by the Philippine Defense Department to remove army and constabulary officials found to be abusive or dishonest. Abuses by civilian officials were documented in complaints forwarded to their respective agencies with the clear threat of adverse publicity if action was not taken. In the case of local elected officials adverse publicity in the press was used to modify their behavior (not always successful), and in the case of abusive or unfair local court actions (particularly by local land courts biased against tenants), the department’s legal office provided free tenant representation. Later, when Magsaysay was elected president, the complaint and action operation was elevated to a commission at the presidential level.


required is fostering among the general public an idea of themselves as citizens and as people who have not only a say in how they are governed but also a responsibility for it.

For these reasons, an important role for expeditionary officers is not only to help with advice to government leaders, but also to foster the growth and evolution of civil society. The development of citizen-based civic, social, and economic organizations such as labor movements, veterans’ organizations, and business associations are vital to promoting democratic understanding and sensibilities among the public. Today, a great deal of international assistance to civil society in vulnerable countries is provided by NGOs. However, their efforts often need a more coordinated, operational, and positive political focus to be truly effective. Expeditionary officers, in liaison with local NGO representatives and working through higher-level channels, should seek to promote such NGO efforts and deepen their impact. For example, expeditionary officers could arrange to bring key civil society leaders and organizers to relevant conferences and learning sessions in the US and elsewhere. Through this, such leaders could become acquainted with like-minded American or allied NGOs, as well as leaders from other countries who may be facing similar problems. This can facilitate connections to help secure more widespread understanding of and financial support for a particular movement’s agenda.

Moreover, civil society movements and organizations are an important means to pressure government leaders to pursue democratic change and to govern responsibly. Occasionally, independent political causes arise that only an independent citizen’s organization can address. In the Philippines, when the honesty of a key congressional election was in doubt and became a vivid issue in the early 1950s, a group of Filipino activists established NAMFREL (National Movement for Free Elections) with quiet US support. This citizen organization went on to ensure the honesty of the 1953 presidential election which Magsaysay won. NAMFREL continues to independently monitor campaigns and elections today. It also publicizes inside information about voter intimidation while broadcasting “quick counts” at election time to forestall post-election ballot box manipulation.

In Afghanistan, where civic organizations have all had to start from scratch, the National Democratic Institute (as part of the National Endowment for Democracy) has supported the creation and operations of the Fair and Free Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA). While considerably less influential than NAMFREL, FEFA has nevertheless provided a large number of trained and honest indigenous polling station observers during a series of national elections. It has also lobbied for stronger election laws with some success. Other Afghan citizen and youth groups

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have been formed with outside assistance and gradually have come to exert considerably greater citizen influence.\textsuperscript{40}

Despite all of its continuing dysfunction, the Afghan government would not be operating half as well as it is today without civil society participation. This serves as a valuable reminder of the importance and utility of supporting a range of citizen organizations in other unstable countries. For instance, trained expeditionary personnel can help indigenous civic organizations organize and spread their efforts to tackle a variety of issues, such as government corruption.

In the past, independent labor unions have been particularly effective instruments for promoting citizen participation and democracy. Authentic representatives of the American labor movement usually enjoy instant \textit{bona fides} with independent indigenous labor unions. As a result, they can play an active advisory and catalytic role in fostering citizen participation.\textsuperscript{41} Where necessary, an expeditionary team could indirectly assist in generating NGO support for assigning labor organizers to selected vulnerable countries where independent labor movements exist or where prodemocratic labor movements can be developed. Moreover, labor unions can play a mediating role in resolving disputes between political leaders and movements, as exemplified by the 2013 experience in Tunisia.\textsuperscript{42} In many countries, there are also opportunities to promote democratic ideas through existing and reorganized unions. Expeditionary officers could facilitate this by bringing in US or allied labor organizers to train and advise local activists not only on how to promote labor rights but also to pressure governments to reflect citizen and human rights more generally in its policies and actions.

\textbf{8. Foster effective economic and social improvements with a positive political impact}

A successful transition to a functioning democratic state will not occur unless the indigenous government can deliver on the promise of improved social and economic prospects for its citizens. People everywhere, including in vulnerable countries, desire a better future for their children. Any aspiring democratic order must provide tangible evidence that this is possible.

\textsuperscript{40} Keynote address at ASAP-USIP-VOA Conference at USIP Headquarters by US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador James Dobbins, February 28, 2014. Also the writer was a volunteer at FEFA headquarters in Kabul during the 2009 national elections and has followed the organization closely ever since.


\textsuperscript{42} \texttt{www.solidaritycenter.org} » ... » Middle East & North Africa, December, 2013.
In many vulnerable countries, USAID in conjunction with foreign governmental and NGO partners will be responsible for economic and social development. The expeditionary team should have a facilitating role in this process. Expeditionary personnel need to understand how such programs can be created and made to work. It should be their unique role to help in collegial fashion with the generation of development ideas and projects that could have beneficial political impact. This is not to deny the value and need for the more traditional “disinterested humanitarian” approach to economic aid. The idea is to supplement the traditional approach with consideration of how economic and social development can also provide political and psychological support for stability and democratic transition.

Among other roles, expeditionary personnel could help indigenous leaders realize their own ideas about sustainable and high political impact economic and social development projects. Simultaneously, expeditionary personnel could also be in a position to recommend the use of the chief of mission’s operational fund to initiate pilot projects such as a decentralized village or urban neighborhood self-help efforts or a pilot micro-credit lending endeavor. If these work, they could be financed on a larger and more permanent scale by more normal economic assistance programs. In countries where there is no USAID mission, expeditionary officers may have to assume a larger role in helping to generate such projects.

Young democracies are more likely to instill hope in their citizens if they focus on economic and social projects that will yield visible results relatively soon as opposed to large infrastructure projects. Examples of such initiatives include the build-up of primary education facilities, basic public health and clean water, improving crops, organizing farmer’s associations, micro-credit in both rural and poor urban areas, village self-help initiatives, and vocational training for urban youth. It may be necessary for expeditionary officers to work with local level officials, rather than simply with central governments, to help identify and initiate programs that are responsive to local needs.

One example of how to provide tangible assistance with positive political effects is the National Solidarity Program run by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in Afghanistan. The program is an effective model of how to help rural villages. It involves the formation of elected village development councils that are usually comprised of traditional village leaders who then decide on and select improvement projects for their communities. Funds are then sent to each village based on its population size to finance the selected projects. The program is financed directly by foreign donors, and there has been little corruption. Disbursements are made from a separate account managed by an international consulting firm hired by the World Bank. Over the past ten years more than 25,000 rural villages (of an estimated total 40,000) throughout Afghanistan have been reached by at least one project, some with two. Villagers usually provide the labor. To help villagers
implement their selected projects, ministry advisory assistance has also been available at the provincial level. Significantly, the ministry states that the top aim of this program is political, to support “the creation of mechanisms for local governance and decisionmaking.” Initially, the program faced little interference from the Taliban, though this has changed in recent years. Nevertheless, the program has continued its forward momentum.\(^{43}\) Apposite to this, it is interesting to note that a majority of rural Afghans in polls over the years continue to think that the country is headed in the right direction despite the Taliban.\(^{44}\)

The approach used to assist rural village development and local self-government in Afghanistan could also be used in distributing improvement grants to poor urban neighborhoods in other vulnerable countries. Such grants would be preceded by the organization of an elected neighborhood association that would then select the project they wished to undertake.

An example of how something similar can be done elsewhere with an expeditionary approach occurred in South Vietnam back in 1962.\(^{45}\) At the time, the Vietnamese government’s counterinsurgency program at the village level had largely stalled because government funds were not reaching the villages. (Among other problems, stringently applied pre-audit procedures were blocking spending). With evidence in hand from rural visits, an American advisor was able to influence the Vietnamese government to adopt an unorthodox way to make counterinsurgency and rural development support from both the Vietnamese and US governments effective. Because of the advisor’s close personal relationships developed during a previous tour, key Vietnamese officials, including a highly nationalistic president, were persuaded not only to decentralize funding but to have the decisions made at the province level by a joint Vietnamese-American committee. This was a significant abrogation of Vietnamese sovereignty which was nevertheless accepted because it would facilitate Vietnamese decisionmaking. To make it work, close contact and a feeling of mutuality was maintained at the national level as well. In a number of instances, ill-conceived province chief actions were corrected with quiet American advice. A major vein of assistance went for hamlet level self-help projects (schools, wells, local road improvements, etc.) which the residents themselves selected. To foster local involvement, a hamlet council had to be elected to become eligible for such

\(^{43}\) www.nspafghanistan.org.


\(^{45}\) This account also illustrates the utility of trusted personal relationships in formulating ways, with US assistance, that indigenous governments can become responsive at the local level despite the usual over-centralization of authority.
projects. As a result, Vietnamese rural development and counterinsurgency efforts became considerably more effective.⁴⁶

9. Help indigenous free and government media promote democratic change

The importance of media in fostering and supporting democratic political aspirations, movements, and leaders cannot be underestimated. As evidenced recently in the “Arab Awakening,” new as well as more traditional forms of media played a significant role in crystallizing widespread popular opinion around the lack of decency and justice made evident in a single tragic suicide in Tunisia. Without media in active support of democratic ideas and amplifying the political and psychological effects of societal improvements that give democracy a tangible meaning, public opinion and institutions to sustain democracy are likely to remain unrealized.

During the Cold War, US Information Agency personnel working in situ supported local prodemocratic and anti-communist media activities. They largely played an informal advisory role, but also provided direct operational support and technical assistance for the development of indigenous government and private media. A variety of methods were used, some overt by USIA other covert by the CIA. They ranged from overt support for Radio Free Europe, to covert support for free press associations, intellectual and writers’ movements that espoused freedom, to supporting the making of films that advocated for democratic practices or showed Communism in a bad light. The campaign was particularly intensive in Europe. In less developed countries such as South Vietnam during its early days, USIA indirectly supported South Vietnamese information efforts to generate support for the newly independent government. In the beginning, because of the lack of local government capability, leaflets and posters supporting the South Vietnamese government were printed on US Information Service presses. This was done overtly but quietly.

Currently, the State Department’s diverse “public diplomacy” outreach concentrates mainly on enhancing the US image abroad. Insofar as local media are used to counter antidemocratic ideas and their adherents and promote in-country democratic change, it is largely done on a project-by-project basis through NGOs or private contractors. In one notable example, US support went through a private contractor for the local production of a specific film in Tunisia that aimed to promote a common understanding of the democratic goals of the revolution.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ The fact that mutual trust later dissolved at the very top of both the Vietnamese and US governments over irreconcilable policy differences did not detract from what had been achieved. See Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters, 113-118.
Taking a broader approach, the expeditionary team would work with local conventional and social media to spread democratic ideas. Officers will typically find opportunities to spread democratic ideas through the local media and by promoting examples of government and civil society actions that boost the public’s understanding of what democracy actually means. Moreover, expeditionary officers could seek to create new opportunities by helping to form free media centers to promote journalistic freedom and to provide professional training to local media personnel. In the same vein, aspiring democrats in fragile states must be able to reach the all too critical part of their target audience, the youth, in their messaging. Expeditionary personnel who will be advising these leaders will help them to do this.

Furthermore, expeditionary personnel should know how to use more than negative criticism in responding to challenges from the antidemocratic opposition. The Chilean film, “No,” the foreign film runner-up in the 2012 Oscars, offers an example of how media operatives are most effective when they can harness a positive message. This film shows how a TV advertising campaign helped convert a "no" vote against continuing Pinochet’s rule. The campaign appealed to a widespread popular demand for greater freedom; it did not exploit anger at the oppression of Pinochet’s rule. The advertising campaign successfully associated a "no" vote with freedom and the happiness that would come with it. The pro-Pinochet campaign, by contrast, unsuccessfully played on negative fears of anarchy if the "no" vote won. In this contest, the positive message won. Pinochet lost and Chile returned to democracy.

Another case shows how giving help to potential media leaders can promote justice system reform. An American NGO assigned a media savvy Arabic-speaking American to identify media personalities interested in promoting a culture of lawfulness in the Arab world. He met with 45 TV, radio, and print executives from eight Arab countries and selected 15 for a culture of lawfulness conference in Sicily (with funding provided by the US government to the NGO). Among the attendees were a young male Saudi journalist and a Saudi female television personality. From the conference, both came away with ideas about how they might promote a culture of lawfulness at home. On his return, the Saudi journalist focused on reforming his country’s religious police. In a ten-part study published in a Bahraini newspaper, he traced the history of the religious police and found that while their goals were grounded in Koranic precepts they were also engaging in corruption and violence. As a result, Saudi women felt persecuted, and Saudis of both genders were

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49 “No” was the runner-up for best foreign film at the 2012 Oscars. In the film a brilliant young producer rejects the pleas of an anti-Pinochet coalition to attack the general on Human Rights violations and instead devises a film which makes viewers feel positively by voting "no.”
alienated. No Saudi newspaper would print it; however, many Saudis accessed the article online. Demand for the study grew, and a private Gulf publisher reprinted it. The printed copy then became the definitive history of the religious police and a clarion call for reform. Moreover, the article launched the Saudi writer’s emergence as a public intellectual. Over a nine-year continuing relationship with the NGO, he built an English-language audience for his writing and gained visibility as a "talking head" on the region’s most widely viewed television networks. Today, the think tank he helped found, and which he now heads, has begun influencing high-level decision makers in numerous Arab countries.

Meanwhile, the Saudi female television personality began hosting critics of the religious police on her talk show, including the Saudi writer and foreign police reform experts. In a regional satellite network interview, she criticized the religious police. Through television and the Internet (YouTube), awareness of the controversy spread. While some religious authorities denounced her, supporters defended her in print, on television, and online. The controversy became a regional “teaching opportunity” advancing the idea of lawfulness and tolerance. The Saudi government has subsequently made reforms in the religious police.

10. Help generate support for the Rule of Law

The Rule of Law is widely understood to be one of the essential pillars of a democratic system. By its very nature, establishing and deepening the Rule of Law is a long-term project. Its success depends on institution building, the creation of an effective justice system, and changes in public attitudes. In most fragile and unstable states, existing justice systems need to be substantially reformed; in others, such systems may have to be developed largely from scratch.

Fostering the Rule of Law has historically been a major focus of US transition and stability endeavors. To date, these efforts have focused to a considerable extent on Latin America, where they’ve been most successful, although there are other examples of progress in Asia and Africa. The first step logically is to ensure that basic safeguards are contained in the adopted constitution with an independent justice system as free as possible from partisan political manipulation. To accomplish this requires not just institution building, but fostering cultural and political change. Changes are needed in the attitudes, beliefs, and practices of the security forces and justice systems, as well as in the public’s understanding of the Rule of Law, including both how it works and why it is important. Indeed, experience has shown that fostering the Rule of Law is more a political than a technical task.50

The role of the expeditionary team would be to foster the development of governmental and citizen-led initiatives to help generate political support for the Rule of Law. This would be followed by sustained efforts over time directed at the general public and government, the armed forces, the police, and the court system.

In one country, as an example, a US NGO launched a public “culture of lawfulness” campaign to support Rule of Law initiatives with US governmental support. The basic idea for the campaign and notions of how to make it work were imported from successful campaigns elsewhere, particularly Colombia (in this case because of cultural similarities). The idea was introduced through seminars to a local NGO which had already mobilized nearly a half million people in general protest against kidnapping and crime. The Mexican NGO then focused on promoting the idea with top leaders of the two major political parties. One of those leaders became president. He subsequently convened a national meeting of 86 top leaders from the government, political parties, civil society, businesses, labor unions and the media, educational and faith-based sectors. This culminated in the National Agreement for Security, Justice, and Legality. The agreement called for major improvements in the country’s Rule of Law institutions while also recognizing the need for a change in the country’s culture, referring specifically to the creation of a culture of lawfulness. The two NGO continued to partner with the Mexican federal ministries of Public Security, Education, and Public Administration to begin incorporating a culture of lawfulness into the training of police and integrity units as well as the public education system at the national, state, and local levels.

Similar campaigns have been launched elsewhere involving national and local governments. While it may not be possible at first to get most vulnerable governments to organize independent government commissions to undertake such efforts that should be an eventual goal. Specific examples of relevant and effective government institutions and campaigns elsewhere are the Culture of Citizenship campaign initiated and directed by the Mayor of Bogotá, Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption, and Botswana’s Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime.51

Expeditionary officers will be expected to find ways to support similar efforts to generate public support for the Rule of Law. They could play an important role in identifying opportunities for advancing Rule of Law principles and practices. In many vulnerable countries, less than capable


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governments may not be initially persuadable that this is a necessary endeavor. The process may have to start with the public itself, and it may well be sparked by a particular event or scandal that makes (perhaps with the help of media) the demonstrated degree of lawlessness or corruption no longer politically bearable. Expeditionary officers should be primed to take advantage of such opportunities and to help citizens organize to promote the idea of a culture of lawfulness and to lobby the government to address its absence.

DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED BASIC EDUCATION AND TRAINING COURSE

The purpose of the proposed basic course described in this paper is to prepare future expeditionary personnel who can influence positive political outcomes in vulnerable states. The basic course's aim is to convey practical knowledge that is directly relevant to conducting political strategy and other shaping actions and to operating effectively under the conditions, opportunities, and obstacles most likely to be encountered. The scope of the proposed teaching program is broad because the specific situations that will be encountered in each country of assignment will be different, even though they may share underlying characteristics. The intent is therefore to prepare expeditionary personnel to be men and women fit to work in all seasons, much of it in uncertain and changing conditions.

While the basic course addresses the vital need to be culturally sensitive, it does not include instruction about a particular country's language, culture, and history. The need for such instruction has been highlighted by the US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the cultural and language knowledge that was necessary to carry out a political strategy was too often insufficient. However crucial this type of instruction is, especially for effective political strategy and action, this paper assumes this training will be added after graduation from the basic course, once an expeditionary officer has been assigned to a particular country.

Ideally, each class of expeditionary officer candidates would include no more than 20 participants at a time to permit adequate personal attention by the faculty and sufficient candidate discussion and class participation. The length of instruction of the basic course, including course review and exams, is calculated at approximately 11 weeks (assuming a five-day instruction week). Cycles of the basic course could begin every three months turning out as many as 80 graduates a year (assuming no drop-outs). After a one-day course introduction and orientation, the proposed course
of instruction will be divided into the following capsules, which will each take approximately one
week to complete:

1. US approaches to transitioning/stabilizing vulnerable states
2. Thinking politically and developing political strategies and action plans
3. Understanding the operational environment of vulnerable states
4. Interpersonal skills needed to become an effective political advisor, catalyst and partner
5. Political organizing and conflict resolution
6. Security, the Rule of Law, economic and social development
7. Democratic development and improving government effectiveness
8. Persuasive use of information and the media
9. Field organization and operations of expeditionary political action teams
10. Overcoming practical operating challenges
11. Course review and final exams

Finally, the proposed education and training program as set forth in this paper is necessarily
preliminary in nature. It is designed to give the reader a general idea of what would be covered in the
course and what it could achieve. In developing this program, a number of other courses for
government and nongovernmental personnel were surveyed to determine current educational
opportunities for training prospective political action candidates.52 While some of these courses

52 In developing this basic course, a survey was conducted of course offerings which appeared relevant at government
institutions in the Washington area such as the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and the National Defense University
(NDU). At FSI this included courses about how the State Department functions, democracy promotion, and intelligence
and political-military affairs. FSI offers a course about stability operations but this has largely been devoted to one
country, Afghanistan. NDU’s past courses have included subjects such as Democratization and US National Security,
War and Democracy, Principles of Political Warfare, National Security Decision Making, and Power, Ideology and
Legitimacy. Most of these courses with the exception of how State functions, are not directly utilitarian in nature.

Also reviewed were courses at the Academy for International Conflict Management and Peace Building at the
US Institute of Peace (USIP), some of which have a more practical focus on field operations. Particularly relevant are
courses currently being given in how to be an effective advisor. Although mainly focused on security sector advisors, the
particular subject matter appears valuable for advisors in all aspects of stabilization assistance including political. A 2012
USIP Report issued in 2012 addresses the subject of “Preparing Advisers for Capacity-Building Missions.” A particularly
pertinent online course currently being offered is: “Fundamentals of Strategic Advising in Reform Environments.” Other
USIP Academy courses with a utilitarian nature have covered such subjects as “Stabilization and Peace Building,
Governance and Democratic Practices in War-to-Peace Transitions” and “Advancing Security Sector Reform and
Governance.” Another source of applicable education is the Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE).

While for the most part not directly applicable to the practical know-how nature of the proposed basic course,
learning centers in the Washington area offer background information for more detailed examples of lesson planning.
Institutions such as George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, American University’s
School of Public Affairs, Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and George Washington University’s Elliot
School of International Affairs are potential resources. There are also other learning centers outside of the Washington
area, such as the Fletcher School at Tufts, which offer related academic courses. The US interagency Vietnam Training
address useful skills and knowledge needed for expeditionary diplomacy, there are no existing programs to train expeditionary officers to operate across multiple sectors, fulfill the various roles, and accomplish the missions previously described. The proposed course represents an effort to fill this critical gap, and will need to be refined over time as new experiences and overseas situations require.

US chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission in unstable countries are key to the success of an effective approach to carrying out political action. A shortened orientation version of the course for chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission is therefore recommended and subsequently described.

**Course Introduction and Orientation**

One day will be spent in providing the participants with a general idea of the course and its basic objectives as well as covering administrative and logistical details. A summary explanation of each component of the course will be presented as well as an overview of how the entire course is intended to fit together. The participants will also be provided with a picture of what they are expected to know and the skills they are expected to have acquired by the conclusion of the course. A complete briefing document explaining the subject matter of the course along with administrative and logistical details will also be provided to each participant.

1. **US approaches to stabilizing/transitioning vulnerable states**

   Expeditionary personnel will not be operating in a US government vacuum. It is therefore important that they possess an adequate knowledge of the US government institutions and practices that relate to stability programs, and particularly to the government programs designed to support democratic

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Center (VTC) is an example of a past, US government employee training program for a specific types of overseas assignments. The center was in operation from 1968 to 1972. Its basic instruction course that prepared trainees to become pacification (counterinsurgency) advisors in the field covered some seven weeks. It consisted of 60 hours of background on Vietnamese culture and history, 143 hours on pacification operations (57.6 hours alone on the role of the advisor), 14 hours on basic Vietnamese language phrases and 23 hours on course orientation, testing, and evaluation. This course was later expanded to eight weeks of basic instruction and ten weeks of intensive Vietnamese language training. There was also a longer course extended to achieve language fluency which lasted an entire year. It showed what a focused effort could achieve and made a considerable difference in the pacification program’s effectiveness on the ground. By the end of its five year existence, the Vietnam Training Center had sent to the pacification advisory program (CORDS) in Vietnam some 1,845 trained advisors from State, AID, Defense, and the CIA, of which an estimated 250 spoke and read Vietnamese at reasonably fluent levels. To be noted about the Center, is that despite widespread civilian antiwar sentiment at the time, a substantial number of the trainees were ex-Peace Corps volunteers who came to understand that the core of the mission was to help South Vietnamese villagers. The source for information about the Vietnam Training center is Bruce Kinsey, *GOOD GUYS: The Quiet Americans Who Tried to Pacify Vietnam*. This is a thoroughly researched and destined to be published 2013 manuscript on loan from the author about the history of CORDS.
transitions. The purpose of this section of instruction would be to provide candidates with an understanding of past and current US stabilization programs and operations. The course of instruction and the time allocated, as described herein, assumes that the candidates already have some knowledge of and experience with stability programs and operations and how the US government operates abroad. This would include participants from NGOs who have worked in close cooperation with the US government on stability operations in various countries. However, a review of the policies, strategies (or lack thereof), programs and operations including “lessons learned” is considered necessary for all participants. For participants without a basic knowledge of the range of US foreign policy and practices in stability operations, this part of the course would need to be augmented (perhaps by weekend sessions). Specifically, this capsule of the course will explore the following topics:

- History of US policies, strategies, operations in support of stabilization and democratic transition in vulnerable states.
- The role of US government organizations in transition/stabilization efforts and how they have operated.
- Current allied governments and UN efforts at supporting stabilization and related US as well as foreign NGO efforts.
- Current US policies, strategies, programs, funding, and organizations involved in transition/stabilization support for vulnerable states.
- Assessment of past and current efforts in terms of what may still be missing such as US government interagency coordination, US-allied coordination, and a political focus.

This section will examine recent examples of success and failures in such operations to probe for underlying causes and how opportunities could have been seized and failures avoided. Taken as a whole, this knowledge will provide a historical backdrop and a framework within which expeditionary personnel will be attempting to achieve their goals and objectives through the use of political action. Basic principles and best practices in stability operations will be studied. How participating US agencies are currently engaged, sources of funding, operational authority and responsibility including authorizing legislation and congressional oversight will also be reviewed. Finally, how the “whole of government” approach has actually worked and been applied in past stability operations will be assessed.

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In addition, the world of NGOs and their operations will be examined. Their contributions and capabilities to assist in transition and stability efforts will be evaluated. Allied and UN capabilities will also be examined. In so far as lessons learned have been documented these will be examined. Gaps in these various capabilities and the prospects for coordination with NGOs and other actors (allies, the UN) will also be analyzed to arrive at constructive approaches.

Attention will be paid to how well the US approach has worked in the past, including what significant lessons have been learned and how operations could be improved. To what degree the potential political effects of such efforts have been recognized and incorporated in actual planning and action will receive specific attention. While it is recognized that some candidates will have greater firsthand knowledge of transition/stabilization efforts than others, it is nevertheless necessary to bring all candidates up to the same level of contemporary understanding. To the extent possible, practitioners with actual field experience—including possibly some participants of the class being trained—will have an important teaching role.

2. **Thinking politically and developing political strategies and action plans**

The purpose of this section of the basic course is to provide participants with a clear understanding of how to think politically and how to develop political strategies and action plans. It is interesting to note that not since the Cold War competition with Communism, particularly in Europe, has there been much of a focus within the US government on developing political strategies to guide US operations. This part of the instruction is intended to begin remedying this gap by developing personnel who are capable of thinking in such terms and who can actively assist in the development of political strategies and action plans for implementation. It will cover the following subjects:

- Defining political strategy and political action
- The art of thinking politically
- Components of political strategy
- Illustrations of relevant political strategies and implementation
- Developing practical political strategies and action plans for implementation
- Adjusting political strategies and action plans to changing field conditions

The aim of this section will be to focus on transmitting practical know-how in developing and implementing political strategies. The course will begin with a definition of what is meant by and how to distinguish between political strategy, political action, and political strategy implementation (action or campaign) plan.
How to think politically and to use political imagination will be taught by example as well by explanation. Most political strategies have been and will be developed in connection with other forms of US assistance, most often security, but also economic development as was the case of the Marshall Plan in Europe. In most instances, if the US is to have influence, it needs to bring something to the table in the form of tangible assistance as well as political advice.

A political action plan lays out in some specificity the tactical actions necessary to carry out the strategy. Such an operational plan will cover in greater specificity and detail the actions to be undertaken and their purpose. It will also describe how to undertake these actions as well as provide preliminary estimates of the resources required. This should include not only actions designed to achieve specific political objectives but also actions aimed at averting anticipated political and security setbacks. Valuable political advice given respectfully to local leaders can consist of both what not to do as well as encouragement to take positive action.54

Moreover, participants will be educated in how to think about the political and psychological effects of US programs and actions. Specific cases of political thinking, as exemplified by the ideas of George F. Kennan and others such as Edward Lansdale, will be studied. Participants will furthermore assess recent and current US programs and actions supporting democratic transitions in terms of their political and psychological effects.

Participants will then evaluate examples of past relevant political strategies and action plans and their results. These examples would include, at a minimum, the following: 1) the Cold War in Europe (the Marshall Plan and related actions), 2) the Philippines (overcoming an insurgency through political as well as military means), 3) early Vietnam (conquering chaos and internal armed opposition to establish an independent country), 4) El Salvador (achieving a political solution to an insurgent threat by making security and democratic government work) and in greater detail, 5) the surge period beginning in 2007 in Iraq.

Expeditionary graduates are likely to become directly involved in developing political strategies and action plans, or at a minimum in modifying them in the field to fit local circumstances, obstacles, and opportunities. Therefore, course instruction will go into detail about how to develop a political strategy for a country, including its components, its relation to overall US strategy and

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54 An example is the advice given by a senior US military official (Admiral Dennis Blair) to a particular leader of an indigenous military force (General Ramos of the Philippines) who trusted him. The advice was to avoid a violent confrontation with peaceful demonstrators despite having received such orders from his own president. Through their discussions, a nonviolent resolution to the stand-off was. Blair, Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions, Volume I Overview and Action Plan.
policy goals, and how to develop an action plan that is realistic and implementable. Working in
teams, class participants will be required to prepare versions of a political strategy and action plan
based on information provided about a prototypical country and estimates of available resources to
support such a strategy.

3. **Understanding the operational environment of vulnerable states**

Expeditionary officers will need to rapidly acquire an understanding of the political and competitive
environment in which they will be working, beyond what can be gleaned from pre-assignment
cultural and history briefings and from existing country assessments and intelligence reports.

The aim of this section of instruction will be to increase candidate capabilities for ferreting
out what is most significant and relevant about a vulnerable state environment and about competing
forces within that environment. Accurate assessments of the human terrain in which the US mission
and, specifically, political action teams will be operating is essential for developing relevant and
actionable political strategies. Correct assessments are also essential to avoid mistakes in judgment by
expeditionary personnel and by the country mission itself.

Instruction will therefore begin with a description of the characteristics of a prototypical
vulnerable state in regard to security, governance, political leadership, and any competing
political/insurgent forces who are undermining stability and opposed to a democratic political
system and government. The political situations in specific countries will be discussed and analyzed
as case examples. The most useful information on which to base political action operations concerns
a country’s culture, system of beliefs, and personal information about key leaders. This is likely to
require additional on-site investigation by expeditionary teams and particularly the team leader.

As such, candidates will be trained to identify and analyze underlying factors that are
frequently the source of instability in vulnerable countries. These could include the problems of
ethnic, religious, or tribal factions, as well as cultural, social, and economic conditions which may
constitute obstacles to the formation of a more coherent, representative, and responsive system of
governance. Moreover, the instruction will focus on how to analyze competing antidemocratic
forces, including their strengths and weaknesses. In response to specific country scenarios,
participants working in teams will be required to develop their own analyses of the competitive
political environment. They will be asked to explain key factors and why they matter politically, as
well as to provide an assessment of the opportunities and obstacles for developing and carrying out a
feasible political strategy.
4. Interpersonal skills needed to become an effective political, advisor, catalyst, and partner

The purpose of this section of instruction will be to sharpen the interpersonal skills required to become an effective expeditionary advisor and catalyst. Such skills are essential to carrying out effectively the previously described missions and roles of the expeditionary team. Of all the elements taught in this basic course, this personal capacity “to make friends and influence people” is probably most essential to the success of the entire idea of fielding expeditionary personnel to carry out political action. As such, one of the primary focuses of the education and training course will be the skills and attitudes needed to develop relationships of mutual trust and confidence. The screening process is designed to help screen-in participants who already possess the basic elements of such attitudes and social skills. This basic course would, however, reemphasize basic behavioral techniques in order to sharpen such skills.

The instruction’s aim is to expand the candidates’ understanding and imagination of how to act as an advisor, catalyst, and partner to indigenous leaders. As such, the instruction will include a review of selected past models of effectiveness such as T.E. Lawrence and Edward G. Lansdale. Other relevant models, persons, and approaches, from the past and recent present will be reviewed. The goal will be to ensure that participants have the attitude and the skills needed to develop relationships of trust and confidence with indigenous leaders and groups. To implement political strategies, an expeditionary officer will also need to apply these same skills in his or her dealings with other officials in the US mission, foreign missions, and UN personnel.

Instruction will begin with a consideration of the persuasive techniques that can be used to insinuate one’s advice and to have these ideas accepted and acted upon. Methods of overcoming local resistance to the advice and ideas of outsiders will also be covered. Successful practitioners (such as General H. R. McMaster and Carter Malkasian) who have been able to win the trust of indigenous leaders and act as catalysts for positive political change will be invited to share their experiences and insights. The importance of personal behavior will be stressed, including the absolute need to demonstrate sincere respect toward local counterparts as a means of overcoming cultural divides. Practical exercises in how to listen empathetically will be utilized. Also, the challenges of how to become accepted as a sincere partner and friend by indigenous leaders while remaining objective in views and advice will be addressed.

To hone a candidate’s interpersonal skills, role-playing scenarios with typical obstacles to exerting influence will be developed, and candidates will be required to present possible solutions. For example, participants will be presented with a description of an indigenous leader or official who may harbor negative views of the US or a deep suspicion of US intentions. The candidates will then
be asked how they might insinuate democratic principles and practices in ways that could win over these officials or leaders.

Finally, scenarios will be developed to illustrate how to achieve positive results in different sets of circumstances and how to plan and execute multiple shaping actions to reach such results. Candidates will be given challenging situations and asked to conceive of multiple actions to achieve a specific political outcome. Class exercises based on these scenarios will challenge and aim to develop a participant’s understanding of the key behavioral factors at work in developing fruitful working relationships and implementing effective political strategy.

5. Political organizing and conflict resolution

The purpose of this section of the basic course is to equip candidates with the practical know-how and techniques to engage in political organizing and conflict mediation in typical vulnerable countries. Expeditionary officers must also be able to advise indigenous leaders and groups how to use these same techniques and skills.

The first part of this section focuses on helping local leaders to develop political parties and citizen-based organizations and movements. This instruction will draw on the practical experiences of political party, citizen association, and labor organizers in the US and abroad. Specific instruction will cover subjects such as

- how to analyze competitive forces (opposing and potentially friendly)
- assessing possible governmental obstacles to political organization, and potential cultural and historical obstructions
- developing a strategy for organizing, including how to start up a new organization or developing a plan to enhance the effectiveness of an existing one
- political outreach methods, including methods of expanding relationships, forging consensus with other leaders and groups, organizing workshops and public meetings, and using social media (text messaging, YouTube, Facebook, etc.) as an organizational and mobilization tool
- developing and implementing a media campaign
- maintaining organizational morale and considering the alternatives of negotiation and compromise or confrontation to achieve change

Instruction in conflict mediation and resolution will cover the overall approach to mediating and resolving internal political conflicts. The purpose is to equip candidates with transmittable skills
about how to plan for and act as mediators to reduce friction and achieve a workable degree of unity among disparate movements and leaders. The instruction should also cover ideas about how to attract adherents whose aspirations may be democratic but who may support antidemocratic forces for other reasons related to family and tradition. It should also aim to help candidates advise indigenous leaders about how to understand conflict and to resolve clashes peacefully. As such, the instruction will cover subject matter such as

- the different causes and dimensions of conflict
- the analytical frameworks that are most useful in assessing conflict
- narrative (perspectives of parties to the conflict) and scenario (possible alternative outcomes) analysis
- navigating cognitive minefields (avoiding group think, psychic numbing, unpredictable disruptive events)
- situation analysis, framing the problem, and defining objectives
- designing and implementing a plan of action

This part of the course will be taught to the extent possible by political organizers and conflict mediators with sufficient practical experience to enrich their lectures with relevant examples. Class participants will review a variety of case studies of successful political organizing and mediation efforts under difficult circumstances. Basic lessons learned will be extracted. Participants will be required to develop their own action plans given a situational scenario requiring political organization. Similarly, participants, working in teams will be required to develop an action plan for resolving a clash of interests depicted in a scenario requiring conflict mediation and resolution.

6. Security, the Rule of Law, economic and social development

Promoting democratic reform of the security sector (including the military and the police), the Rule of Law, and economic and social development are among the most important objectives in fostering stability and democratic transitions in vulnerable states. (Economic, financial, and foreign relations issues on a macro scale are critically important but beyond expeditionary team responsibilities.) As a practical matter, team personnel are not likely to have the prime US mission responsibility for addressing security and economic and social development challenges. Rule of Law development, at least in its initial stages, may be a different situation. In any case, team personnel need to know enough to weigh in with political perspectives and strategic advice about how the needs in each of
these sectors can be addressed in ways that support enduring stability and positive political outcomes. Expeditionary officers will also be called on to provide help in dealing with the unique challenges presented by these sectors. In this capacity, expeditionary team input will be essential, both for ensuring that the political dimensions of development are not neglected in mission-level strategic planning, and in helping to design and implement development programs and action plans with beneficial political effects.

Establishing adequate security has to go beyond the traditional technical aspects of force training and stress the political and civic duties of security forces. Using examples from the past and the direct experience of practitioners as part-time faculty, class participants will be given a range of practical ideas about how to shape local security forces to ensure that their operations earn the support of civilian populations and are compatible with overall democratic goals.

Similarly, fostering Rule of Law is principally a political undertaking requiring the development of a culture of lawfulness. Class participants will explore the various approaches and techniques that expeditionary personnel might use to encourage a culture of lawfulness. This could be approached from the top down, for example, by persuading personal contacts at top government leadership positions of the importance of creating independent commissions to address the issue. To initiate the process it appears more likely that significant public pressure will need to be exerted from the bottom up. To this end, participants will consider how to approach this by developing contacts with leaders of citizen movements and other public opinion-shapers and persuading them to become engaged.

Candidates will consider the key sectors and actors that an action plan to develop a culture of lawfulness should seek to engage, including law enforcement and other public sector employees, mass media, school-based education, and centers of moral and religious authority. Moreover, participants will examine the obstacles that expeditionary teams are likely to face in fostering Rule of Law and practical ways of how to overcome them. For example, expeditionary officers could fruitfully partner with local religious NGOs who have contacts with religious leaders to encourage their needed support in a campaign to foster lawfulness.

In regard to social and economic development participants will consider how best to incorporate such development programs into an overall political strategy. They will acquire a political perspective in looking at economic and social development. They will analyze past examples of successful types of development which achieved a significant positive political and psychological impact. As in the security and Rule of Law sectors, expeditionary officers will be prepared to weigh in with political
perspectives in the course of mission economic and social development project and program planning and implementation.

Finally, experience-based “best practices” in improving security, implementing the Rule of Law and in economic and social development derived from past stabilization support operations will be reviewed. At the conclusion of this segment, participants will once again be organized into teams. A vulnerable state environment will be described to them, and they will be required to outline their own approaches, as if they were in the field, to fostering security sector reform, implementation of the Rule of Law and economic and social development in support of stabilization and transition political goals.

7. Democratic political development and improving government effectiveness

The purpose of this component of the basic course is to provide class participants with a thorough understanding of the main opportunities and challenges facing democratic development in fragile states, including those where the experience with democracy is limited. Since the development of democratic political leaders, institutions, and practices is intertwined with improving government effectiveness, instruction will also cover how to help those elements of government that are essential to realizing progress in democratic transitions. This section of instruction is particularly relevant to the key task of assisting prodemocratic leaders to emerge and govern effectively.

Class participants will consider both how to define democracy as well as the feasibility and practicalities of developing a democratic form of governance in politically divided and contested states. They will be taught how to think strategically about democracy promotion, including how to determine what essential elements of basic democracy should be fostered initially in order for democracy to become institutionalized over time. Instruction will also focus on the essentials of creating responsive governance. Thus, candidates will also be trained to recognize the characteristics of good leadership, to give sound political advice about democracy indirectly with imaginative concepts, and to build on local ideas that could sustain democratic habits of mind.

Expeditionary personnel will need to be able to promote essential principles of democracy to indigenous leaders and in imaginative ways. These essentials include governance that responds to the needs of the majority of the people while protecting minority rights. Leaders must also seek to provide adequate security and encourage broad-based citizen participation while taking actions to enhance citizen well-being and provide hope for the future. Existing governments with ostensible democratic aspirations may have retained attitudes that are overly autocratic and top-down in nature. For these reasons, the class will explore actions that can be taken to improve government
responsiveness, including complaint and action programs, allowing free use of the Internet for local
complaints to surface, allowing media to operate reasonably freely, indoctrinating administrative
officials in public service attitudes, tackling corruption and effectively decentralizing government
functions so that development and participation from the bottom up is encouraged.

While future practitioners of the art of political action will be primarily focused on democratic
political development, they will also need to understand how their activities and other US programs
and actions can assist in “state-building” and the development of more effective governing
arrangements. For these reasons, it is proposed that the basic course use the framework of state-
building in fragile countries developed by the Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE) to guide
instruction. The ISE framework addresses ten core functions identified as essential for states to
perform in order to achieve stability in the 21st century environment. These are: 1) Rule of Law; 2)
legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; 3) administrative control; 4) management of public
finances; 5) investment in human capital; 6) delineation of citizenship rights and duties; 7) provision
of infrastructure; 8) formation of the market; 9) management of the state’s assets (including the
environment, natural resources, and cultural assets; 10) international relations (including entering
into international contracts and public borrowing.) (These core functions may appear politically
antiseptic, but in their treatment within ISE framework, they incorporate democratic values).

Candidates will discuss the importance of politics and the unique role of expeditionary personnel
in abetting these institution-building efforts. How the most important functions with political
significance could be improved and what role expeditionary personnel could play in the process will
be intensively examined. The class will also explore ways to harmonize the state-building efforts led
by other friendly countries and the UN with US political strategy objectives.

8. Persuasive use of information and the media

The objective of this portion of the basic course is to provide an understanding of how to develop
and work with indigenous free and government media for the purposes of fostering stability and
positive political change. A principal goal of this section of instruction will be to examine the
psychological impact of the media and how it can be used for persuasive political purposes.

The course will begin with a brief survey of the history of psychological warfare, including the
effective use of information and the media during the Cold War to support democracy and oppose
Communism. It will then explore the important differences between current US public diplomacy
efforts that aim to burnish the US image abroad and the support of indigenous efforts that aim to
shape a country’s public consciousness and opinion. The competitive nature of the contest for
message dominance between pro- and antidemocratic forces will be analyzed. Moreover, the importance of understanding that public perception trumps objective reality (largely a Western concept) in vulnerable states will also be discussed, as will the types of messages that can be most effective in supporting indigenous government efforts to win population support. Along with this, class instruction will include exercises in the preparation of effective messages (both visual and written) and discussion about how the traditional and electronic media can be used to achieve primacy in the struggle with competing antidemocratic forces and to set political agendas. In addition to this discussion of the competitive nature of the media environment in a prototypical fragile country, other factors will be addressed such as the degree of government control.

Finally, the course will explore the practicalities of how various forms of media, including social media, can be used to disseminate information that favors democratic development and democratic forces and leaders. Expeditionary officers will learn how to transmit advice and knowledge to indigenous civil society organizers about media-based ways to enhance their organization’s psychological and political impact. Different scenarios based on a country’s media availability (including the Internet) will be used as a learning tool with students to develop ideas of how best to use communication networks for positive political purposes. Since many vulnerable states have limited existing media capabilities, the class will also consider opportunities and ideas for improving media capabilities, including the formation of free media associations. In conclusion, class participants will be organized into teams and asked to prepare an action plan, based on the media environment of a prototypical state, about how available media could be used to support democratic outcomes.

9. Field organization and operations of expeditionary political action teams

The objective of this component of the basic course will be to prepare expeditionary candidates for their actual field assignments in a US mission abroad. It will describe how a typical team would operate, including where it would be located in the US mission organization, to whom it would be responsible, required and discretionary reporting requirements, operational security requirements, and how operations should be initiated and conducted.

Expeditionary team authority and responsibilities will be spelled out, including the nature of the team’s relationship with the chief of mission, with various embassy sections, and with other US agencies operating in-country. The class will consider how expeditionary officers can coordinate their work effectively with others from the US mission as well as with representatives from friendly countries and the UN. The instruction will also cover how best to coordinate with NGOs (US and others). The availability of supporting resources such as the proposed chief of mission’s operational
fund, as well as specialized personnel who might be called upon to facilitate specific political action missions, will also be thoroughly discussed.

At the end of this section, the class will consider the likely obstacles that US expeditionary teams will face based on the situation of a theoretical country. The participants will then consider how team operations can be initiated effectively. Course graduates selected for designation as team leaders should receive enhanced instruction that will cover their additional responsibilities prior to field assignment. Administrative and security personnel will also receive appropriate separate instruction about their responsibilities as well as a general briefing on the kinds of activity that will be undertaken by operational members of the expeditionary team.

10. **Overcoming practical operating challenges**

This section of instruction will seek to prepare candidates for the types of real life situations that they are likely to encounter when assigned to the field. The emphasis will be on practical ideas of how best to overcome an assortment of probable obstacles and difficulties.

The current State Department security rules and procedures, which are based on a risk avoidance rather than a risk management approach, constitute a serious obstacle for all civilian US mission personnel operating in insecure countries (with the exception of DOD, CIA and DEA). Indeed, these rules sharply curtail efforts to collect even the information required to meet conventional State reporting requirements. Insofar as the expeditionary team is concerned, there must be a shift in approach to risk management. Class participants will consider how exceptions to standard security rules could be established so as to permit maintaining an adequate expeditionary team presence outside the embassy compound. Otherwise, expeditionary officers will not have the chance to develop those local relationships that are so essential to their mission.

Practitioners who have successfully operated outside the wire in insecure countries will be called in for their advice. Class participants will be given a hypothetical situation in an imaginary country and asked to design a personal security plan for conducting political operations. Some preliminary instruction in personal security techniques and behaviors will also be provided. (It is to be noted that such preliminary training may well be insufficient for expeditionary personnel to work effectively “outside the wire.” More intensive training in operating in a hostile environment similar to that which is provided to the CIA or the military may be necessary).

In addition, the class will consider how to look out for and overcome the typical internal bureaucratic and turf protection obstacles that inevitably arise within US missions. In the same vein,
typical obstacles likely to be encountered in the host country environment and ways to get around them will be analyzed. In addition, the issue of how best to handle one’s own frustration at a lack of progress will be considered. Political progress in vulnerable states will rarely be straightforward, so such frustrations will be unavoidable. Candidates will need to understand the importance of timing and possess the personal and tactical flexibility to refocus on other objectives for which more immediate progress is possible when this is needed. Practitioners who have persevered under similar difficult conditions will be called in to discuss such problems and how to deal with them based on their own experience.

11. Course review and final exams

This final component of the course will review the most important aspects of previous instruction. Particular attention will be paid to a reprise of the instruction about interpersonal relationships and how to become an effective political action catalyst/operative. Candidates will be asked to present their own impressions about what they have learned from various aspects of the curriculum.

At the conclusion, there will be a comprehensive written exam to test the extent of knowledge gained. This would include brief essays about how the candidate would respond to a number of potentially difficult scenarios that would be devised by the course faculty. Moreover, all candidates will be interviewed to determine what they have learned and also to receive feedback about the relevance and effectiveness of the training’s content and presentation.

Post-graduation evaluation of participants

Based on candidate participation and performance in exercises during various parts of the course, graduates will be evaluated. Graduates will also be evaluated on the basis of papers they have submitted and on the basis of the final written and oral exams. Using a combination of observation by faculty, papers submitted, and oral and written exams, candidates will be ranked on the basis of their overall understanding of the instruction and on their responsiveness to important elements of the instruction. In addition, graduates with a particular talent for conceptualizing messages and using media in imaginative ways will have that capability noted. Others would be graded on their ability to generate potentially workable political ideas and on understanding how best to insinuate them into the actions and political discourse of indigenous leaders and groups. A particular talent for understanding how to organize politically would be noted. These notations of special talents would be used to help determine future assignments. Obviously, those graduates who score high in all categories of instruction and have previously scored high in almost all facets of the screening process would be considered prime candidates to be selected as team leaders.
Language and cultural training for expeditionary officers

After the standard 12-week basic course for expeditionary personnel is completed, it is proposed that graduates should receive intensive language training that is pertinent to the proposed country of assignment and lasting as long as nine months. The idea would be to raise each participant up to a level of language proficiency that could then be honed by continued study and use during overseas assignment. Language studies would be accompanied by courses in the country of assignment’s culture and history. Some introductory language and cultural training could possibly begin part-time in the evenings during the basic course for those candidates with an already designated country assignment. On the other hand, considerable time will be required beyond regular class periods for student reading, research, and preparation of materials and scenarios for presentation and discussion in class. Those graduates who already possess added language capability would be given shorter tune-up instruction.

ORIENTATION COURSE FOR CHIEFS (AND DEPUTY CHIEFS) OF MISSION

The objective of this important course is to orient chiefs (and deputy chiefs) of mission about two subjects: 1) how they can themselves play an expeditionary role in effecting political change, and 2) how they can best use the talents of an expeditionary team to help shape political progress in an assigned vulnerable country. The orientation course will include in summary fashion the essential elements of the basic training course for expeditionary personnel. This is intended to ensure that the chief of mission and his/her deputy are working off the same page as their assigned expeditionary team.

It is important that all chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission who will have expeditionary teams serving under them receive this orientation in advance of team assignment. Assembling a class of at least eight at a time is likely to be a scheduling challenge. Some may have already been assigned to a particular country and will need to be recalled; others may be at different posts awaiting assignment. However, such scheduling challenges can be overcome. Given the limited number of vulnerable countries designated for the assignment of expeditionary teams, these orientation classes are unlikely in any case to have more than ten attendees at a time.

In most instances, the staff faculty involved in the basic course will also lead the orientation classes. The method of instruction will consist mainly of lectures along with intensive class
discussion. The proposed orientation will cover the following subjects with the overall course taking approximately 12 working days to complete.

- **Review of US and allied policies and practices for transition/stabilization assistance.**
  This section will provide an overview of applicable US policies and approaches, organizations, and available funding for transition/stabilization assistance to vulnerable countries. This will include a survey of NGO operations and activities as well. The existence of special funds for certain regions (Middle East and North Africa, for example) and how they might be tapped will be reviewed. This instruction will assume that the participants have a certain basic knowledge of the subject matter but that it needs to be updated.

- **Understanding the vulnerable state operating environment.**
  Participants will explore the significant differences between relatively stable states and the situations likely to prevail in most vulnerable countries, with relevant examples. The concept of a “competitive political environment” in which democratic proponents compete with antidemocratic forces will also be examined. Moreover, participants will explore the kinds of information that will be needed to effectively map a competitive environment and to develop a political strategy and action plan to support democratic transition and stabilization.

- **Thinking politically and the need for and utility of political strategy and action plans.**
  Participants will consider what it means to think and to act politically. They will review the definitions of political action and strategy, and then they will consider successful and unsuccessful examples of political strategy and action in foreign countries from the Cold War to the present. They will then explore how a political strategy and action plan could be used to supplement traditional diplomacy and conventional security and socio-economic development assistance programs. Moreover, participants will discuss how political strategy could be used to guide the development of current mission planning documents including the Mission Strategic Resource Plan.

- **How to be an effective expeditionary diplomat.**
  This will provide an overview of how effective expeditionary diplomats establish trusting partnerships to become advisors and catalysts of positive political change. Included will be a review of the personality characteristics as well as skills required for an effective political action operative in the field. The need for expeditionary personnel to have the opportunity and freedom to build local relationships of mutual trust will be stressed. The participants will also explore how the work of expeditionary personnel could supplement and support the work of chiefs of mission. This would include assistance with intra-mission coordination and the use of more informal “back door” access to indigenous leaders to enhance formal efforts.
• **Political organizing and conflict mediation.**
  This section will provide a summary briefing on the principles and techniques of effective political organizing and conflict mediation. Participants will discuss how these techniques might be applied in typical vulnerable state situations, from organizing civil society groups to fostering the development of national compacts.

• **The political dimensions of stabilization/transition assistance.**
  During this component, participants will be briefed on best practices in security sector reform, Rule of Law, and social and economic development. By reviewing case studies, they will analyze the political opportunities and obstacles likely to be faced by expeditionary officers in each of the sectors. The importance of measuring the value of various sector-specific programs in terms of their short- and long-term political impact will also be discussed. Finally, the participants will consider the political dimensions of development, including how political strategy, assessment, and action can improve performance of sector-focused programs given typical vulnerable state situations.

• **Democratic development and improving indigenous government effectiveness.**
  Participants will consider the range of obstacles and opportunities for fostering democratic development and transition by reviewing a number of cases studies, including both successes and failures. Participants will also discuss the core functions of effective states and the interrelationship between democratic development and the responsiveness and effectiveness of government. This will focus particularly on approaches to improving indigenous governance.

• **Information and media.**
  Participants will review the conventional embassy/mission public diplomacy role and programs in the light of a more proactive, media and information-based approach that aims to foster indigenous political dynamics. Examples of actions that could be taken to support local prodemocratic media will be explored, including how expeditionary team members could work through NGOs to support such efforts.

• **Models of expeditionary diplomacy.**
  The purpose of this part of the orientation is to provide the knowledge of how they, as chiefs of mission, could and should play a proactive role in promoting stability in vulnerable countries. How to work effectively in partnership with the US military in advisory situations will be covered. Participants will review and discuss case studies in effective expeditionary diplomacy, an outstanding example being that practiced by Ambassador Crocker in Iraq. This aspect of the orientation leads into the next subject about making effective use of expeditionary teams.

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55 Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends: General Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out in Iraq*, 148-152, 268-272. This book, although mainly about General Petraeus, gives a summary view of the political advisory activities of Ambassador Crocker, how he was able to insert himself and key members of his staff into the Iraqi political process with positive effect and how he was able to work cooperatively with the military.
• Supporting and supervising the operations of expeditionary teams.

This part will focus on how participants, as chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission, can best supervise and support expeditionary team operations. The course will review previously adopted administrative arrangements and operating guidelines for expeditionary teams posted to US missions. Issues of coordination and fostering cooperation within the mission as a whole and with other agencies will also be discussed. The importance of avoiding micromanagement and giving the expeditionary team sufficient freedom of action to achieve results will also be considered. The need for team members to have access to a wide range of indigenous political groups will be discussed, as will the need for the team leader to have direct access as necessary to high-level leaders and officials. For the work of the expeditionary team to be successful, the need for staunch backing by chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission will be emphasized. To buttress this and other points, case studies will be used as necessary.

Orientation participants will also discuss the development of a mission-level political strategy, as well as how an existing overall mission strategy can be adapted to reflect changing political reality on the ground. How the expeditionary team and particularly the team leader could help with these planning efforts will be described and discussed. Moreover, the need for responsiveness in making tactical operational changes in light of changes in local political conditions will be stressed. Also, how the expeditionary team could help chiefs of mission coordinate stability and transition efforts will be discussed.

Finally, the class will discuss the ground rules for keeping the chief of mission and his deputy informed. This will include discussion of expeditionary team reporting and accounting requirements. Guidelines and procedures concerning use of the proposed operational fund to support team operations will receive particular attention. How special security arrangements could be developed and approved for expeditionary team members will be considered. This particular component of the orientation course is estimated to require two days to discuss and complete.

• Orientation Course Review.

It is estimated that one additional day will be needed to review the main points of the orientation, to review participant understanding of its content and to clarify as necessary various questions.
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF FACULTY FOR THE BASIC COURSE AND ORIENTATION

For the screening and assessment process, an experienced psychologist in the assessment of character and personality would be recruited on a consulting basis. This person would also serve as a resident member of the resident faculty. An additional source of part-time assistance for the assessment process might be Special Operations Forces (SOF) assessment personnel on loan. Resident faculty for the basic course may also be recruited from those with relevant experience teaching at the National Defense University (NDU) or other government instruction centers. Another source would be personnel with relevant experience from State, Defense, USAID and other agencies who are on rotation for an extended period of assignment in the Washington area. Recently retired government civilian and military as well as nongovernment personnel with field advisory experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other crisis countries are another likely source for recruitment. Some part-time faculty with relevant knowledge could be recruited from retired US government personnel, NGOs and from other institutions and think tanks.

To provide a more detailed look at Washington-based, US country mission and NGO organization, programs and operations in support of stabilization and transition, part-time faculty could come from these same institutions and from NGOs in the Washington area. This could be supplemented with presentations by practitioners with relevant experience and who are based in the Washington area or who could be called in from elsewhere. For the section on political strategy and action, faculty could come from a selection of instructors in the nongovernment foreign policy and national security community who think this way and teach about it. This may also be supplemented by selected practitioners with experience in developing and implementing strategies for stability operations and who also have a facility for thinking politically.

Perhaps the most challenging section of instruction for which skilled faculty will be needed concerns how to be an effective expeditionary advisor, catalyst, and operative. This subject will be handled in a series of seminars and role-playing exercises. To the extent possible, seminar leaders should be experienced operators or those who have actually taught relevant courses elsewhere such as how to be an effective advisor. Another potential source of instruction is the private sector, including those involved in teaching about how to influence people in the business world. Faculty for understanding the environment in fragile states could come from government and nongovernment sources with an intelligence background. Such persons should have actually worked in unstable countries and have a good sense of the conflicting factors at work. For instruction on political
organizing, part-time faculty could come from the at-large community of citizen group and labor organizers, preferably those with experience in other countries. For democratic political development and government improvement, part-time faculty could come from academics, particularly those with on-the-ground experience such as Larry Diamond (Iraq) and, from the Institute for State Effectiveness, Clare Lockhart (Afghanistan).

To cover the section on the political uses and psychological impact of information and media, faculty would consist of media experts from the NGO community or the private sector. These faculty members should be experienced in the use of media to support democratic transition in the face of hostile competing forces. Faculty for instruction about existing US mission personal security requirements could come from State security personnel with recent experience in unstable countries. Ideas about arrangements modifying such practices so as to permit adequate outside contact could come from both security and nonsecurity personnel who have actually been able to implement such arrangements. Instruction in how expeditionary personnel are expected to operate would be provided by experienced team leaders and mission chiefs who will be in direct charge of the expeditionary force. If outside training in how to operate in a hostile environment is needed, this could be supplied by other agencies who engage in special training for this purpose.

Faculty for the orientation course for chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission would come from the in-house faculty for the basic course and would be supplemented by the director of the expeditionary group. This core faculty group could be supplemented by temporary instructors such as retired US government personnel (or in a few cases, personnel on active duty) who have served successfully in an expeditionary role.

MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF EXPEDITIONARY PERSONNEL

Wherever the expeditionary diplomacy force is located, most likely within the State Department, it will need a director and an administrative staff. The director and staff will be responsible for the administration, training, and management of the force. Responsibilities will include personnel review and promotion, personnel assignment including terms of assignment, leave arrangements, and all facets of human resource management. The director and staff will also have the responsibility of assigning additional expeditionary group personnel to the teams and for finding, engaging, and

deploying other consultants, most on a shorter-term basis, to support and facilitate field operations. The director and staff will conduct field inspections and will assist in resolving possible team administrative and operational conflicts. Before expeditionary teams are assigned to the field, the director of the expeditionary group will develop in conjunction with other State Department officials the necessary organizational arrangements and operating guidelines for these teams.

As mentioned in the first working paper, Fostering Positive Political Change: The Key to Stabilizing Vulnerable States, some exceptional personnel measures will need to be established in order to recruit and retain the proposed expeditionary force. Such measures could include the creation of a separate personnel category and even an added career track of “expeditionary diplomat” within the State Department. Given the additional risks and physical and mental hardships such service will require, it should receive high-level recognition along with a career promotional path up to mission chief and beyond. Assignment periods would be longer than conventional tours of duty and, therefore, will allow for special leave arrangements. Periods of leave could be longer. Timing should allow for back-up coverage while away from the scene. The approach would be much different from the extraordinary civilian arrangements in Afghanistan which allowed for a chopped up on-the-scene work presence ultimately detrimental to the mission.

The deployment of expeditionary personnel should ideally occur within a framework of a general political strategy that has been adopted by the country mission and Washington. The strategy should describe its objectives, the competitive political environment in a given country, and provide a general idea of the means available for its implementation. However, until the expeditionary team leader arrives on the scene to evaluate the strategy and develop a plan for its implementation the strategy should not be finalized. Given the tendency for unforeseen events, new problems, and new opportunities to arise in vulnerable states, the strategy and its implementation must be flexible enough to accommodate rapid change.

Team personnel assigned to country missions would work directly under the US chief of mission, and in his or her absence, the deputy chief of mission. Trained personnel from the expeditionary group in Washington would be assigned to teams in the field under the direction of a team leader. Full-time team personnel would consist mainly of generalists and some specialists working on security, governance, media, development, or the Rule of Law. They would be serving a longer tour than is normal practice and would be tasked with developing key relationships with

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57 Ambassador Marc Grossman (now retired) suggested “creating a new personnel specialty, ‘expeditionary diplomat,’” within the State Department. He went on to recommend advanced training and the preparation of “a small but significant number of people to serve successfully in the hardest places at a moment’s notice.” See “Diplomacy Before and After Conflict,” PRISM 1, No. 4, August 2008. http://www.ndu.edu/press/diplomacy-before-after-conflict.html.
political and civic groups and leaders and with key government officials. These officers, particularly the team leader, would also help the chief of mission coordinate and integrate political strategy and action efforts with other elements of the US mission.

Once in the field, the expeditionary team leader could, as previously noted, request the assignment of particular specialists from other agencies or from the private sector on a contract basis. These consultants would have shorter-term assignments to organize particular programs with constructive political impact. An example might be organizing a civil society veteran’s movement to assist in absorbing excess militia, or organizing discharged regular military veterans to integrate back into society as a pro-democratic force. Other assignments might be to help labor unions become an active pro-democratic force, helping organize an association of free media to include print and broadcast elements, or to help organize a civil society movement (and/or a government agency) for combating corruption and fostering a culture of lawfulness.

Such an operation is obviously easier to conduct in a relatively open society with a welcoming government rather than under other circumstances in which there is still a hangover of attitudes and habits from a previously autocratic regime or where nationalist or post-colonial sensitivities are acute. Progress will not be achieved immediately everywhere. In the more difficult countries, expeditionary team operations may have to be inaugurated by a core expeditionary team including the leader, an assistant, and an administrative assistant. The team leader would initiate relationships that would then facilitate the entry of others to deal with particular opportunities. To be effective, overt expeditionary team operations will have to be conducted in a confidential manner and sensitive elements will need to be classified. Depending on the host government degree of acceptance and the prevailing public attitudes toward the US presence, creative approaches will be called for.

As required under present rules, the expeditionary team leader will need to be a certified program manager and the lead administrative person a certified financial officer. In the performance evaluation process, team leaders will periodically assess team personnel and will have the authority to remove team members for cause. The team leader’s performance, in turn, will be evaluated by the relevant chief of mission and also by the director of the expeditionary group. The director’s recommendations concerning future assignment and promotion of team leaders will be dispositive. It is anticipated that the director and deputy director of the expeditionary group will need to travel to posts where teams are serving to learn firsthand from the teams and from the chiefs of mission how the team is faring and to help resolve any jurisdictional or support problems.
Expeditionary Operational Fund

As discussed in the first working paper, Fostering Positive Political Change: The Key to Stabilizing Vulnerable States, an operational fund is essential to support the expeditionary team’s mission and its operations. As described in the discussion of missions and roles, many of the team’s projects and actions cannot be anticipated and precisely budgeted in advance. Moreover, many opportunities to make a difference need to be supported in a timely fashion not possible if standard State and USAID project approval requirements have to be followed. The operational fund would be disbursed under the authority of the chief of mission. As previously described, the fund would support but not be limited to such activities as bringing in additional personnel for short-term actions (helping establish personal links for team personnel for example), sending local leaders to conferences abroad, specific short-term media projects, piloting responsive government projects such as complaint and action programs and other priority activities that cannot be readily foreseen. Established guidelines would govern the use of and accounting for such a fund.

Initiating Expeditionary Operations

Assuming the concept of creating an expeditionary group is approved and is in the process of organization, it is important that its purpose and capabilities not be oversold either within the US government or to the public. As previously mentioned, there could be a tendency in the press to oversell and even sensationalize its prospects as the solution to our problems of dealing with unstable states and promoting democratic transitions. The creation of the expeditionary group and the description of what it is intended to do needs to be placed in perspective. It is a supplement to and not a replacement for traditional diplomacy. Also, it should be made clear that there are countries in which focusing on the political aspect will take considerable time to show positive results. This is because the local climate of opinion may be insufficiently welcoming to US involvement or because the country’s political and related problems are not susceptible to shorter-term solutions but instead require perseverance and time.
In considering the feasibility of launching a serious expeditionary capability, budget cost is a necessary factor. Given a set of assumptions, it is possible to prepare an order-of-magnitude two-year budget, the details of which are contained in Appendix B. The basic assumptions are these: expeditionary personnel will be participating in a low footprint approach to stabilization and transition, training classes are restricted to 20 participants each, followed by an extended eight-month period of language and area training for most students, and an average team of nine expeditionary officers will be dispatched to an estimated eight priority countries (some attrition is assumed). Obviously, if team size is reduced, more countries could be covered and some expeditionary personnel. Many already possess adequate language capability. However in order to develop an order-of-magnitude budget some standard assumptions were necessary. Should some personnel be deployed to the field sooner than anticipated this would not change the overall budget significantly. On the other hand, if a large-scale intervention occurred, the entire training and deployment effort for expeditionary personnel would have to be radically ramped up. Hopefully if this is to occur in the future, enough personnel may have been cycled through the system that there will be a trained reserve force that could be called up to help.

How the expeditionary approach might work out in practice could be considerably different. For example, the size of the teams will depend on the country of assignment and the opportunities for an expeditionary team to address the full range of its capabilities. Some teams would be smaller for smaller countries or for more limited missions due to local circumstances. Although the proposed force is designed for extended overseas assignments a few individuals could be called off for high priority emergency assignments. However, splintering this capability should absolutely be an exception rather than the rule. It must not become a “firehouse” force. For an order-of-magnitude budget to be prepared, some assumptions in addition to the ones above about the training and deployment of expeditionary officers had to be made, including the following:

Assumptions

- The total period of education and training including language and area training for expeditionary personnel is estimated to require one year. This will consist of three months for
the basic course plus nine months of intensive language training and country familiarization.\textsuperscript{58} There will be a basic course class of 20 participants starting every three months. This means that approximately 80 participants will have passed through the basic course and language and area training by the end of the first year.

- The cost of special security training in operating in a hostile environment is not included in this budget as the extent to which it will be required is not known. If such training is required it would add to the time required for training and to the cost.

- The number of graduates and expeditionary personnel ready for assignment after the 12-month training period at the beginning of the second year is estimated to number 72. This assumes an attrition rate during and after the training period of approximately 10 percent.

- During the second year, it is assumed that eight teams of approximately nine persons each will be assigned in successive waves at three-month intervals to overseas posts. Each team will have about three junior members who will serve as assistants to the rest of the team. In addition, there will be three administrative personnel and one security expert to support the team. Therefore, during the second year of operation, following the above schedule, the operational team member years of overseas service are estimated at 45. The person years of overseas administrative support personnel amount to approximately 12. The security expert number of person years overseas amounts to 4. Given the lag in overseas assignment based on graduating a class every three months, the total number of team members still in training and thus in Washington is estimated at 27. (This is relevant for calculating personnel costs.) See below for the difference in estimated annual personnel costs per expeditionary team member located in the Washington area and abroad.

- When assigned overseas, an average annual cost for each expeditionary operational team member is estimated at $600,000. This is assumed to cover salary, special leave arrangements, hazardous duty pay, hardship post differential, transportation within the country of assignment, working space, security support, and so on. Within the US an average annual personnel cost per operational expeditionary team member is estimated at approximately $150,000. The cost of administrative personnel assigned overseas to support the expeditionary team is estimated at $400,000 per year. The security expert overseas is estimated to cost $600,000 per year.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{58} FSI estimates that 36 weeks would be required to reach reading level one and speaking level two in proficiency in Arabic, as an example. Information obtained by phone call between Rufus Phillips and Arabic language section of FSI on 5 November 2013.

\textsuperscript{59} The estimated man years overseas are based on the administrative support personnel being assigned as the teams are assigned. The orientation of administrative personnel for overseas service is anticipated to require a month and will take place at the headquarters office and be provided by headquarters staff (the additional cost of TDY for these personnel are subsumed in the screening and recruitment costs). The yearly cost of placing a political team member is based on information provided informally by State Department contacts. For the Washington, DC area the average costs for salaries and benefits for administrative employees have been based on the General Schedule for the civil service pay scale.
• Each of the nine teams overseas will have a yearly chief of mission’s operational fund at its disposal of approximately six million dollars. This amount can be larger for some countries and smaller for others. It is assumed that none of this fund will be spent in the first year. Sixty percent of the fund is assumed to be expended during the second year.

• For the first year, the headquarters office for the expeditionary force will have a senior staff of five officials. There will also be a salaried in situ teaching faculty of approximately six, including a psychologist. An average annual cost of $200,000 per person for senior staff and faculty is estimated. An administrative support staff of ten is estimated at an average annual cost of $75,000 per person. It is assumed that about two months of additional time will be required to get the headquarters and teaching faculty organized, equipment acquired, and space arranged. For the first year the annual cost of salaries and benefits has been increased by a factor of 1.2.

• For the second year, the headquarters senior staff is estimated to increase to a total of 8 and the support staff to 15 given the increasing workload involved in supporting teams overseas.

• Foreign and domestic travel for the headquarters senior staff and faculty for the first year is estimated at $100,000. For the second year, travel is estimated at $300,000 because of the expanded need for travel to locations where teams have been assigned.

• For the first and second year an estimated five thousand square feet of office space will be required for headquarters staff and resident faculty at an annual rental cost of $40 per square foot for the first year and $44 for the second.

• Equipment and material costs for headquarters are estimated at one million dollars for the first year, and $300,000 annually thereafter.

• NDU or equivalent support for the basic course, including classroom space, is estimated at $3,000 per student. Student materials are estimated at $1,000 per student. It is also assumed, as is currently the case, that language training at the Foreign Service Institute will be provided at no charge for personnel who are State employees. For those belonging to another agency, a cost of $100 per day per person is assumed. In the case at hand it is assumed that 80 percent of all students are State Department employees.

• The cost of the intermittent use of outside faculty for the basic education and training course is estimated at the maximum government rate of $550 per day. It is assumed for each of four classes a year there will be ten outside consulting faculty averaging three days of instruction per

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for G-12, step 1, plus a locality adjustment of 24%. The average scale for headquarters staff is based on an assumed level of basic pay for professionals of $160,000 plus the locality adjustment. The average pay for political action team members while stationed in Washington assumes an average base of $120,000 (minimum for professionals) plus locality adjustment. For the second year, pay has been increased by 2% across the board. Figures have been rounded off for general cost estimating purposes.

60 This estimate is based proportionately on similar costs for a recent ten months course at NDU with approximately the same number of participants.
person. In addition, there is a per diem cost of $200 per person for three days and an average transportation cost per person of $1,000. This amounts to a total of 120 man days for each year.

- While in training, it is assumed that 50 percent of all expeditionary trainees are on TDY and will require per diem reimbursement (including lodging plus food and amenities) at $130 per day (lodging at $59, food and amenities at $71). There is an estimated annual transportation cost of $5,000 per student.

- It is assumed that space for the orientation course for chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission will be provided at the Foreign Service Institute free of charge and the course faculty will come mainly from the full-time expeditionary force faculty. Presentations will be made and discussions led by some consultants with relevant overseas service. Additional costs for the orientation have been estimated not to exceed $100,000 per year.

**Budget Estimates**

The estimated annual order-of-magnitude budget for the first year of operation is approximately US$ 16,000,000. The estimated annual order-of-magnitude budget for the second year of operation is approximately US$ 83,000,000 (See Appendix B for details).

The annual budget for the third year of operation would depend on the number and size of the teams in operation.
Appendix A

An Illustrative Political Strategy and Initial Implementation in a Prototypical Vulnerable State

The Challenge and Its Importance

A particular prototypical state in the Middle East-North Africa region is in the early stages of a transition from autocratic domination by a recently overthrown single ruler to a future political system. The US among other Western countries supported the overthrow. The country’s political system could transition into another autocracy (religious or secular) with an extremist agenda that is hostile to the US (possibly harboring extremists capable of direct harm) and inherently unstable. Alternatively, the country could transition to a system of government that is basically democratic in nature and enjoys majority popular support and thus has a reasonable chance to remain stable. If the country transitions toward basic democracy, it might not always agree with US policy in the region, but it would not be actively hostile to the US or its interests. A democratic rather than an autocratic outcome is a reasonably high priority within the spectrum of US security interests, and is therefore worth a significant effort by the US government to influence that outcome using available means. After weighing the risks of non-intervention versus intervention, the US has decided to engage in a limited intervention with a small footprint focused mainly, but not entirely, on the country’s future political and security sector development. This intervention will include the assignment of an expeditionary team, a small military advisory and training team, and a small economic and social development assistance team (not a standard USAID mission). An annual contingency fund of approximately eight million dollars has been provided to the US chief of mission to support expeditionary team operations and projects designed to foster stability and democratic transition.

The State and Its Environment

The prototypical state has a population of about ten million. The country is majority Muslim (about 90 percent) with a minority of several other religions, mainly Christians. The common language is Arabic. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunnis so there is little intra-Muslim sectarian strife. It is located in the general North Africa-Middle East region and has natural resources, mainly oil and gas, which it is exploiting to meet its economic needs. However, current income does not match all current needs.

A long-time dictator has recently been overthrown leaving the population with little experience in democratic self-government. Nevertheless, there is a national yearning for a democratic government.
that respects and listens to its own citizens. More than 50 percent of the population is under 30, and many of them are unemployed. The level of education is uneven with most of the urbanized areas being literate while the rural areas are predominately illiterate. A vacuum exists in government administration, since the civil service that existed under the dictatorship was weak. During the effort to overthrow the dictator, the national army was split into two factions, those that joined the rebels and those that supported the dictator (the latter either fled or were disarmed; some are prisoners). A working judicial system is practically nonexistent. The police were formerly used to suppress the population and have not been reoriented and retrained for a different role in a more democratic society. Various insurgent militias emerged to fight the dictatorship and helped defeat it. Several have pledged allegiance to the nascent national government, but all have kept their arms including several jihadist groups hostile to democracy. Many militias are providing security for the population in their particular area. However, there are abuses of power and a general atmosphere of insecurity prevails.

An interim national assembly was elected to form an interim government and draft a national constitution. Members were elected from a multiplicity of parties, and this has made reaching consensus difficult. The legislature was, however, able to elect an interim prime minister who has formed an interim government. The drafting of the constitution has been stalled by disagreement over the degree to which it will have a religious or secular basis. The idea of developing a national dialogue to reach more of a consensus about the constitution has been broached. However, the leaders of the main religious and secular forces need to reach an agreement first on whether a more neutral interim government should be appointed.

The existing interim government has not been effective in tackling major problems, such as beginning to create a national army and police force to absorb some of the militias while disarming others. The chief of the army who supported the revolution is growing restless at the inefficiency of the interim government and particularly at the breakdown of law and order. He is reported to be considering a military takeover. Some murders are occurring of well-known secularists but little is happening to apprehend the extremists thought to be responsible. The prime minister and his appointed minister of defense know each other; however, a relationship of mutual trust does not exist between them and the army chief.

There is a welcoming atmosphere for US and Western military and economic assistance in general, but the population is generally discouraged by the slowness with which this assistance has materialized. The situation is complicated, moreover, by some xenophobia in regard to foreigners in general, particularly Westerners. The country was once a European colony, and a deep-seated aversion to perceived Western “imperialism” remains as do suspicions about the intent of US foreign policy in the region. There is a minority segment of the population with leaders who oppose any assistance from the West and will lambaste existing and future governments for accepting it. Public participation in civic affairs was suppressed for so long that it has to be developed largely from scratch. A significant amount of mutual mistrust exists among various elements of the population and between some rural tribal groupings and the urbanized population. There are depressed, poor urban neighborhoods in the capital city and rural areas that have long been neglected and constitute
potential bases for insurgent activity and recruitment. There is also a hangover problem of dealing in a just manner with security force and civilian remnants that supported the dictator.

Terrorist incidents, including assassinations and kidnappings, are beginning to take place although there is as yet no organized insurgency operating against the interim government. Criminal gangs also exist. Some financing for extremist political and militia elements is coming from private sources based mainly in the Gulf emirates.

The current political leadership in the interim general assembly and government is splintered and weak. Political actors have emerged with little experience in open democratic politics. Mistrust is pervasive between many of the emerging leaders, and this hampers the formation of coalitions and a consensus about the way forward. Political parties have begun to organize but they are led in highly individualistic ways and they often represent different factions (secular, Muslim Brotherhood, Sufi, etc.) There is little understanding of the need for pluralism and tolerance. Civil society organizations are beginning to emerge.

An Islamist political party with Brotherhood connections has the largest number of seats, though not a majority, in the interim national assembly. This allowed the party to take the lead in forming an interim government and appointing a prime minister. A labor movement also exists which was formerly government controlled. The overthrow created a media vacuum which has since begun to be filled by nascent private and government-run efforts. Governance remains weak, the rule of law is largely absent, and corruption at all levels is a problem. Basic services including education need to be reconstituted and the country lacks a coherent vision of a way forward.

**Designing a Political Strategy**

*Assumptions about the Country in Question*

The host country’s atmosphere is currently sufficiently friendly that US offers to help with problems of security and development (broadly conceived) are likely to be accepted, so long as they are couched in the right way and involve minimal obvious intrusion. Outside help to local NGOs from the US and other friendly country NGOs to provide technical assistance for aspects of democratic transition such as setting up and running elections is broadly acceptable. There are nationalistic and religious sensitivities that need to be understood and not provoked in ways that could be counterproductive to democratic political goals. Statements made by members of the US Congress and on the Internet about the country or against Islam that are interpreted as hostile further complicate relations.

Based on the widely shared sentiments fueling the original revolt, the majority of the population wants a system of government and leadership that respects them and their basic rights, provides them with an acceptable level of physical security, is reasonably transparent and not corrupt, treats them with justice and fairness, is truly concerned about their wellbeing, and is seen to be actually
trying to do something about it. In short, they would like to see life breathed into the democratic aspirations of their yet to be adopted constitution and by subsequent elections and actual government performance. Moreover, if the majority sees tangible progress in this regard and basic issues of security and economic well-being are addressed, it is believed that they will be willing to show some patience. However, most of the population is under 30, tends to be more idealistic, and is also more impatient. Their aspirations need to be addressed, too.

Assumptions about US Policies and Approach

There is a policy consensus in Washington that strongly supports US assistance to the country in question in support of a transition to democratic stability. There is also general agreement on a political as well as programmatic approach to that assistance.

The newly arrived US mission chief (ambassador) has expeditionary diplomatic experience, is proactive in outlook and is generally supportive of US involvement in political development as well as in the broad range of stability support operations including social and economic development. A trained Arabic-speaking expeditionary team leader with an assistant has just been assigned to work under the mission chief. Additional expeditionary specialists with language capabilities can be brought in as needed, provided local acceptance of the added presence, to address various aspects of assisting with stabilization and transition.

Also recently assigned is an Arabic-speaking security sector reform advisor from DOD who can call on additional DOD specialists including SOF advisory/training teams as necessary. While there is no USAID mission, a small team of aid personnel with expeditionary experience has just been sent out to explore avenues of developmental assistance. The expeditionary team leader and the assigned DOD senior advisor have already developed a good working relationship with each other through mutual consultation while in Washington.

The chief of mission designates the newly arrived expeditionary team leader as the mission coordinator for stability and transition assistance. He makes it clear to all agency heads that he will not put up with “Potomac-like” turf battles within the overall mission. He also makes it clear to all embassy personnel and all agency heads that he expects cooperation and team work in undertaking the stability and transition mission. He and the expeditionary team leader, who is officially his senior political advisor (whatever his title), have a meeting of the minds on the ground rules for expeditionary team operations as well as on reporting and financial accounting requirements. So far as the expeditionary team is concerned, it is understood that the usual mission situation of 75 percent of the time being spent talking to other Americans and 25 percent with local leaders will be reversed.

The insertion of expeditionary team members, starting with the leader, will be done with some finesse. The first task is to make local acquaintances and to get a better on-the-ground understanding

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61 A discretionary reporting system will be created to keep the chief of mission informed with periodic reports being provided to Washington.
of the political climate and forces while simultaneously gaining the confidence of key local officials. In the same way, only a few US military advisory and economic assistance personnel would be assigned initially to develop a more detailed plan for more expansive assistance programs working jointly with elements of the interim government.

Given the deteriorating conditions in the vulnerable country, the State Department’s security officers do not regard it as secure. Hence the security restrictions imposed on American civilians working outside the embassy have hampered contact with local leaders. The expeditionary team will be granted freedom to work “outside the wire” under an exception to the standard rules. This risk management rather than a risk avoidance approach is necessary in order to develop and maintain indigenous relationships essential to the team’s work.

Further, the chief of mission has been authorized an operational contingency fund of up to eight million dollars annually to finance expeditionary team activities in support of stability and democratic transition. The expeditionary team leader is able to call on the home base in Washington to arrange for additional personnel, whether inside or outside the government, to support specific efforts. The team will also liaise with the missions of the UN and other friendly countries which are already involved in supporting stability and transition and are developing specific programs and projects directly and through their own NGOs. As of yet, no informal mechanism for coordinating the efforts of representatives from friendly governments has been created in-country.

The US government, supported by Congress, understands that it will take several years for improvements in the country’s political, security, economic, and social condition to have more than an equal chance of lasting. The Congress has approved funding for a small footprint across-the-board assistance effort and anticipates that this will be a multi-year effort.

Finally, there is an underutilized asset which can potentially be deployed on a limited basis to help establish connections between expeditionary team members and indigenous leaders. During the revolution, some American citizens joined the fight on the ground against the dictator and therefore have in-country contacts as well as credibility. However, these US citizens have not yet been approached by expeditionary personnel.

**Political Strategy**

An outline US political strategy has been prepared for the country in question. The team leader of the expeditionary group has had some input to its preparation. However, an action plan remains to be developed to implement the strategy. The preparation of such a plan is one of the first responsibilities of the team leader, as he develops initial contacts and learns more about the environment and key leaders with whom he will be dealing.

Some of the questions the team leader will pose are the following: Who are the pro-democratic and non-democratic forces and leaders competing for political change; what are their strengths and weaknesses, who are their advisers? What are the immediate challenges for furthering democratic
change? What are the potential adverse political events to be avoided? What are the opportunities for establishing effective security and what are the obstacles? What are the opportunities for developing greater political unity and what are the inherent vulnerabilities and weaknesses that constitute obstacles? How can the lack of the Rule of Law and the presence of corruption best be combated? What other factors, demographic, economic or social, constitute significant opportunities for or obstacles to democratic development?

As answers to these questions emerge, it becomes possible to develop a more detailed political action plan. Within political strategy guidelines, the expeditionary team leader will take the lead in developing the plan subject to inter-mission discussion and approval by the Chief of Mission. The plan will lay out various lines of action to be undertaken by all US representatives involved in providing assistance to the country, not just the expeditionary team. Washington has accepted the notion that the approved political strategy is meant as a guide not a straitjacket.

Opportunities and Obstacles

The action plan focuses on realistic opportunities to effect positive political change. It seeks to describe what the expeditionary team and the US mission as a whole can do to take advantage of these opportunities and to avoid disastrous mistakes. The plan also seeks to anticipate potential major problems and to suggest potential actions to avoid or minimize possible damages.62

The action plan lists as a top priority the fostering of an adequate national political consensus on a democratic constitution that can be adopted by the interim assembly, go to referendum, and be approved. The other priority opportunity is to improve the internal security situation through security sector reform. This will involve the absorption of some armed militias and the dissolution of others. The adverse event to be avoided in this action plan is a military coup in response to a deteriorating security situation and continuing interim government political paralysis.

The most pressing political challenge for the expeditionary team is fostering enough political unity between various factions and their leaders to form a consensus about the basic nature of the constitution. So long as this process does not move forward, disunity is likely to increase. The most immediate opportunity is to help initiate a dialogue between the main political actors of all factions, including non-violent Islamists, to permit a rough consensus to emerge around a constitution that incorporates basic democratic principles. This process will require considerable effort to sustain, given the fractured and inexperienced nature of the body politic as well as the active opposition to such a constitution by some anti-democratic forces. While expeditionary teams work to reconcile and facilitate dialogue among the factions in country, the US mission chief should urge the UN representative to sponsor the creation of a “national dialogue” as a way of knitting various leaders together. Simultaneously, support for the idea at the UN is sought through Washington and the US ambassador to the UN.

62 This possibility was addressed in the preparation of the surge political and military strategy in Iraq in 2007.
Another urgent priority, reform of the security sector, requires working with the interim government to address the challenges of rising terrorism, an incipient rural insurgency and substantial criminality. The interim prime minister, the interim ministers of defense and interior, and the chief of the army all appear open to advice. A main obstacle to establishing effective security is obviously the existence of numerous militias, some of which are extreme and operate with little respect for the civilian population. One advisable course of action would be to incentivize willing militia units to incorporate into a revamped and reoriented military and police structure that is supportive of democracy. By integrating willing elements first it appears that public support for the hostile elements can be drained away. An alternative strategy could involve creating entirely new security forces. But this will likely fail to produce desirable results and is not recommended because of the lengthy time it would take before the new forces could be effective (see, for example, the case of Iraq). Without the political integration of some of the militias into a new security structure, there is also the clear possibility that more will engage in outright resistance. This could turn into a full-blown homegrown insurgency that would be difficult to arrest while official government forces are still weak.

To implement the recommended strategy, there is another obstacle to be overcome first, the lack of trust between the army chief and the civilian government. Overcoming this becomes a necessity in order to avoid a coup that would return the transition to pre-revolutionary conditions. A key task for the expeditionary team leader, in coordination with the principal US military advisor, is to help bring the civilian side of the interim government into a working relationship with the army chief.

There are other opportunities that need to be addressed. One is the need for the interim government to push forward on some high-visibility improvements in citizen well-being to persuade the public that democratic governance can actually work. These improvements could include microeconomic and social development as well as solving macro-economic problems. The development of free as well as government media capabilities is also urgently needed because improvements in governance need to be publicized to affect public opinion. Also needed is an effort to jumpstart the development of civil society organizations. Effective civic organizations can begin tackling such problems as corruption and a malfunctioning legal system. They can also bring citizen concerns out into the open, pressuring the political leadership to take action. There is additionally the important need to help the interim government develop election laws, register voters, and generally prepare to carry out a well-run and honest referendum on the constitution. Achieving these goals can be greatly assisted by US and international NGOs, and expeditionary personnel can be instrumental in coordinating their efforts along with allied government and UN agencies that can field capabilities.

Goals (Ends)

The desired outcome of the political strategy and action plan is the creation within a ten-year time frame of a reasonably stable and democratizing state that has undergone at least one peaceful transition of power from one civilian-led political party to another. On this basis, efforts in the initial two to three years should focus on the following political priorities: 1) the development of a
consensus through national dialogue about a constitution that enshrines basic democratic values and rights; 2) the adoption of that constitution through a popular referendum; 3) the emergence of a majority coalition of leaders and parties who are favorable to basic democracy; 4) the emergence through free elections of a moderate political leadership and constitutionally based government; 5) the integration of the militias and some of the holdover police forces into a new national security structure that consists of an army, a rural constabulary, and police; 6) the implementation of a just way to deal with holdover pro-dictator forces and leaders (possibly a truth and reconciliation commission, except for those clearly guilty of crimes); 7) the launch of a culture of lawfulness campaign aimed at building support for the Rule of Law from the bottom up; 8) the generation through the media of a broad public discussion on Rule of Law principles that involves political, religious and civic leaders; 9) the initiation of government programs that address the most urgent social and economic needs; 10) the start of efforts by the interim government to decentralize authority to the local level to demonstrate an interest in sharing power and the feasibility of building democratic self-government from the ground up; and 11) the setting up of a transparent government financial system.

It is assumed that major macroeconomic issues have or will be satisfactorily addressed and indigenous government revenues will exist to finance basic needs and programs with supplemental World Bank, IMF, and other foreign assistance.

Moreover, it is assumed that the goal of a vibrant civil society has begun to be addressed by the development of an independent and healthy labor movement favoring democratic transition, the creation of a free media with the majority favoring democratization, and the formation of other civil society organizations such as an independent citizens’ movement devoted to monitoring elections, another devoted to combatting corruption by fostering a culture of lawfulness, a veterans’ organization to absorb discharged or retired regular soldiers as well as former militia members who accept its prodemocratic principles.

Intermediate goals would seek to build on progress toward the initial goals by increasing the institutionalization of a democratic political and governmental system.

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63 In addition to the integration of these forces into a national security structure, programs and shaping actions should be implemented which aim to reorient them toward respecting the population, accepting civilian authority, and acting with integrity and dedication. Moreover, these forces should continue to be trained to operate effectively against armed insurgents, terrorists, and criminals.

64 These programs could include such activities as vocational training programs for youth, some tangible development projects for rural and urban distressed areas such as new schools, agricultural technical assistance with improved seeds and crop growing methods, and small improvements chosen by locally elected village development councils, and micro-credit initiatives for business.
Action Plan Completion and Implementation

Immediate Steps

The expeditionary team and particularly its leader will conduct an initial assessment of the competitive environment, including opportunities and obstacles. It is assumed that some critical information about key local leaders and their motivations is missing. Filling in these gaps by developing personal relations with local officials should therefore be an urgent priority for expeditionary officers. As the expeditionary team acquires a better grip on what makes the country, its people, and the leading actors tick, it will, with the approval of the mission chief, flesh out an ongoing action plan for strategy implementation. The development and initiation of that plan of action will be coordinated with other key members of the US country mission. An initial focus will be on actions needed to prevent ongoing problems from breaking into unmanageable crises and on taking advantage of opportunities to foster stability and transition.

Given this focus, averting the potential crisis brewing between the army chief and the interim civilian government and reconciling these two parties becomes a top priority. How this could be handled is described below.

The army chief is relatively inaccessible to the existing US mission, which has been unable to establish any meaningful relationship with him. Nonetheless, it is apparent that he is a key factor in what is likely to happen with the transition. The principal US military advisor needs to develop a working relationship with the army chief as soon as possible. At the expeditionary team leader’s request, research back in Washington discovers that within the émigré community in the US there is someone who has a close personal relationship with the army chief and is willing to introduce the chief US military advisor to him on a personal basis. This person is temporarily brought on board and, using the mission chief’s contingency fund (security clearance requirements are waived), is flown in to help establish the US military advisor’s bona fides with the army chief.

The US military advisor learns firsthand of the army chief’s dissatisfaction with the existing situation and his lack of confidence in the interim prime minister and defense ministers. The expeditionary team leader helps to bring the prime minister and the minister of defense, with whom a budding relationship has been developed, into a working relationship with the army chief. This is driven by the need to develop a plan for US security assistance that involves both military and civil aspects in reconstituting the army and police and phasing out the militias. The US sponsors a series of meetings involving the army chief and the interim prime minister as well as the civilian defense and interior ministers. These discussions gradually morph into a discussion of how to meet immediate challenges with US representatives fading into the background and introducing ideas indirectly. With quiet US encouragement these meetings build trust between the civilian and military leadership. In addition, a US advisor who is experienced in police intelligence work is assigned to help the minister of interior prevent destabilizing assassinations thus addressing an immediate security issue. At the same time, a senior police sector reform expert—possibly from Europe—could be brought in to help develop the specifics jointly with the minister of interior of a program to
reorient and retrain the police. The US expeditionary team leader would play a behind the scenes role in promoting these actions and in following up. The team leader will also bring in another expeditionary officer to follow up on security reform efforts as other political actions need his or her direct involvement.

As the expeditionary team grows in members and establishes relationships with an ever-wider range of indigenous leaders and movements, it will increasingly become the eyes and ears of the chief of mission. Through this, the team will help to anticipate serious local political problems before they arise and they will also proactively identify new political opportunities where the US can make a difference.

Under the direction of the team leader, various expeditionary officers will be subsequently organized to follow several lines of action in different sectors of activity to promote both stability and transition. Given the circumstances of the prototypical country in question, the expeditionary team will most likely become involved with the following activity sectors and actions.

**Political Development**

As previously stated, an urgent priority of the political strategy is the adoption of a democratic constitution. To achieve this, what is most needed is a political process that could help reconcile different views about the basic contents of the constitution. Based on experience elsewhere and with US encouragement, the UN has begun to sponsor a national dialogue involving all political parties as well as representatives from civil society, the media, and religious and tribal leaders. The expeditionary team would work through its expanding contacts to urge key local leaders to support this initiative. As the dialogue goes forward, the expeditionary team would then help to organize a local media campaign, either directly or through an NGO, to build public support for the incorporation by consensus of democratic principles into the constitution.

At the same time, an expeditionary team member will be tasked with developing relationships with the local media. An Arabic-speaking regional media specialist is brought in on a temporary basis to assist in making introductions and exploring opportunities. In addition, some immediate support from the mission contingency fund is provided (perhaps discreetly via an NGO) to support local media efforts, for example helping a local TV station initiate a public affairs program. The lack of experience in the country’s free and government-run media outlets constitutes a challenge, as does the media controlled by antidemocratic forces. However, as needed, additional friendly advisory assistance would be mobilized from elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking world.

Once the interim government has devised the draft constitution, the expeditionary team would seek to ensure that the national referendum for its adoption is free and has widespread participation. To assist in the referendum process, the expeditionary team would encourage NGO support for the adoption of internationally acceptable rules governing the referendum and for the training of election administrators, and an election complaints commission. Indirect support could also be

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65 This is not an intelligence function nor is it intended to be.
provided to the government and to the local media for advertising the referendum. Support for the media could also include advice on communications and messaging aimed at encouraging broad public participation.

The overall effort to foster national political unity would be coordinated by the team leader, who would also work closely with friendly embassies as well as NGOs that are engaged or willing to become engaged. On the initiative of the expeditionary team leader, and with chief of mission approval, an in-country informal stability/transition coordinating committee would be formed that includes other friendly missions. (To avoid an overly prominent US role, the committee could be chaired by an able representative from another friendly mission.)

As the political situation evolves, an additional activity would be arranging for selected indigenous leaders with genuine talent and a democratic orientation to attend relevant conferences and meetings abroad. This would give them the opportunity to get to know other leaders from their own country and elsewhere with whom they could begin networking and forging alliances. This could be facilitated as needed by an accompanying expeditionary team officer.

*Demonstrating Government Responsiveness*

While the constitution is being formulated and put to referendum, and while elections are held for parliament and a new government is sworn in, there is an urgent need for the interim government to undertake actions that raise public morale and give hope for the future. These actions would be aimed at demonstrating the new government’s more responsive attitudes towards its own people thus fleshing out the meaning of a democratic transition. In addition to inculcating a new public-spirited attitude in the security forces, the injustices of past governments need to be addressed. Particularly sensitive are problems of corruption and abusive treatment by government officials and security forces and the fact that avenues for redressing such wrongs have not existed. One approach might be to set up a complaint and action system administered by a government commission (with a board made up from various political and societal sectors). The commission staff would investigate citizen complaints about official misbehavior, and various elements of the government would be called out to address the complaints. (How this might work will be different from country to country). Contingency funds could be used to support this experiment. If successful, the commission could then set a precedent for how a more permanent government would operate.

*Media Development*

The continuing development of free media beyond supporting the referendum is important. The expeditionary team would continue reaching out to prodemocratic indigenous media directly and indirectly through NGOs and other allies. The coverage of conferences, democratic political and civic leader speeches, as well as talk shows and radio and television skits to disseminate prodemocratic ideas and to encourage political unity will be encouraged. In addition to news coverage, humor can also be politically influential. One comedy drama might poke gentle fun at politicians who are all “me-first” convinced they alone can solve the country’s problems and nobody
else is to be trusted. Such programs could counter the negativity of competing antidemocratic media by demonstrating how applying democratic rules values is something that ennobles people and makes them happy. Local publishing houses could be encouraged to become outlets for writings by outstanding scholars favorable to the compatibility of Islam and democracy (similar to some of the local intellectual prodemocratic media activity which USIA used to support). The efforts of the expeditionary team in this sector could be supplemented as needed by temporary specialists brought in from the outside.

Civil Society

Another line of action would support the emergence of civil society organizations that favor democracy. Some examples would be an independent labor movement, a veteran’s association, a citizen group to monitor and help ensure free and fair elections, citizens for honest government, citizens for a culture of lawfulness and other public-spirited endeavors. At least one expeditionary team member would be assigned to work on this portfolio. Existing civil society groups supporting democratic unity would be contacted and encouraged to convene meetings and forums about political affairs. Selected leaders would be invited to attend conferences abroad on civil society organization. As necessary, shorter term labor/civil society organizers would be imported to teach organizational techniques and provide advice. Labor organizers could be made available from the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS) with funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Holding public meetings to discuss such basic democratic underpinnings as tolerance and pluralism would be supported and also given media coverage. A televised “soap opera” series could be developed in which various ideas about democracy and politics with resonance at the family level are debated (between old and young, wife and husband).

Security Sector Reform

While the expeditionary team is focusing on shaping political outcomes, the US principal military advisor and his/her team would likely be involved in related courses of action vis-à-vis the security sector. They would encourage security sector leaders to develop a working plan for security sector reform. After an assessment, portions of the existing militias could be incorporated into various parts of the country’s new security structure. This would be a step-by-step process so as not to leave an area without any security force presence. There would be a special orientation program for the incorporated militia. The existing security forces would be retrained and appropriately equipped for their new duties. Training programs sponsored and supported by various friendly countries in addition to the US would be conducted in an on-going manner for the entire force, including the incorporated militia.

In addition to basic military or policing skills, training would be focused on inculcating a code of conduct, respect for civilians and a rationale for service based on protecting the civilian population and the democratic goals of the constitution. A pilot training program for militia not accepted into service as well as those discharged from regular service could be started, with expeditionary team assistance, to help develop skills suitable for private sector employment. (This could be picked up by
more regular aid assistance similar to US support in Colombia, through NGOs and private contractors, to help facilitate the incorporation of former FARC guerrillas into civilian life. As previously suggested, the creation of a veteran’s organization could help channel those who have been discharged in a positive political direction. An important role of the expeditionary team, while working cooperatively with US military advisors, would be to foster cooperation between indigenous civil and military leaders. Expeditionary officers could encourage civilian leaders to provide input for the general education of the security forces, particularly concerning the underlying democratic political rationale for such service.

**Economic and Social Development**

The initial emphasis of development assistance should be on selecting pilot projects that are capable of wider expansion and sustainability and that reflect a “people first” approach. One such program might consist of supporting self-development projects in selected and politically consequential villages and urban neighborhoods. First, a local development council would be elected. That council would then be informed of the size of the grant that they will receive based on the size of their population. The council would then choose a simple but cost-effective project or improvement. This could include potable water wells, fish ponds, access roads, cleaning out abandoned irrigation systems or similar small improvement projects. Grant monies would then be given to the neighborhood or village council and, with the participation of local labor, the project would be built. Initial financial assistance (using contingency funds, if necessary) could be channeled via a nascent government organization with some technical assistance provided.

The implementation of such a program would be intended to provide visible evidence that government was actually accomplishing something of direct benefit to its people. Such an effort could be started on a cooperative basis between the expeditionary team and the US economic assistance representative. Start-up technical assistance as needed would be obtained, (possibly using contingency funds), from experienced US experts or from other sources. This effort could subsequently be scaled up on a national basis with longer-term outside financial assistance or financed internally. Notably, very similar successful nationwide programs were initiated with outside technical assistance and continue in Afghanistan as well as Indonesia). Additional economic and social development assistance could focus on other projects with a positive psychological and political impact.

In areas where an incipient insurgency may be developing, indigenous provincial reconstruction teams (based on the model of US provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan) could be fielded to work hand in hand with indigenous security forces to gain local population support while defeating the insurgency with a minimum of force. US SOF forces could play an advisory role in this effort, with civilian advisory support coming from USAID and from the expeditionary group with field experience. While funding for a program of this kind might come from DOD, the initial training of indigenous civilians who will be participating in effort could be supported by the expeditionary team.
Culture of Lawfulness/Rule of Law

The development of a fairer and more workable system of justice needs to go hand in hand with the reform of the security sector. The most urgent problem is how to deal in a just manner with the active supporters of the previous regime who are now in custody. If allowed to fester, this situation will continue to roil the political waters and detract from political unity and progress. One approach that expeditionary personnel could encourage would involve the creation of a reconciliation council to hear the cases of those who have committed crimes for which there is inadequate evidence for legal prosecution.

At the same time, the long process of establishing the Rule of Law needs to begin. The expeditionary team will play a role in helping citizen concerns about corruption and a lack of lawfulness evolve into a civic organization devoted to creating a culture of lawfulness. This could begin by tasking an expeditionary officer to initiate contacts with civic activists to encourage them to develop such an association. A specific opportunity may exist to encourage this effort because a particularly egregious case of criminality or corruption has created a citizen reaction. The initiation of an organized effort could be sparked by inviting concerned civic leaders to attend an international conference about the culture of lawfulness. Visits by other potential leaders could be made to countries where citizens have already been successful in persuading societies and governments to embrace the Rule of Law.

It is realistic to expect, even after an elected government is installed, that attention may become focused on more immediate issues such as security or political infighting. This will make it difficult to mount a concerted effort to promote Rule of Law and the underlying culture of lawfulness needed to sustain it. Under such circumstances progress may well depend on a citizen-based effort aimed at raising public consciousness and exerting political pressure at the top. The expeditionary team would seek out citizen, business, and religious leaders interested in this issue and encourage them to organize an umbrella organization to promote a culture of lawfulness. Depending on the acceptability of an open US government role, such an organization could be supported either directly or via a locally based NGO. Later, other elements of the US mission, NGOs as well as private contractors, may become involved in the longer-term more technical effort of institutionalizing the Rule of Law. However, the expeditionary team would continue its involvement on the political side of the issue.

Other important aspects of state building such as macroeconomic advice and assistance would likely to be handled by organizations such as the IMF. The IMF and the World Bank could also handle the extension of temporary financial assistance to the country until its revenues permit repayment. Setting up the host government’s financial system to make it transparent and accountable could be handled by an experienced team from the US Treasury or by similarly experienced personnel from other Western nations.
Resources (Means)

The personnel needed for the implementation of the political strategy would come from reservoirs of existing US government and NGO employees and, in the case of an expeditionary team, from the creation and training of such a force. It is contemplated that the in-country full-time expeditionary team would maintain a small footprint, no more than eight to ten on longer-term assignment. Additional short-term specialized support would be engaged as needed to supplement team efforts with special expertise. The DOD-supported advisory and training mission would be relatively small, perhaps initially consisting of mainly SOF personnel with a few top-level advisors. The economic aid office would also be small. It is believed that a smaller mission on this scale would greatly mitigate the coordination and cooperation problems that have plagued larger-scale efforts. Out of country military and police training could also be done in Europe and the US.

As previously mentioned, the success of expeditionary efforts will necessitate access to a contingency fund to support team operations and projects. The fund would have general guidelines for its use, and expenditures would be authorized by the chief of mission. He or she would approve expenditures based on substantively documented project requests by the expeditionary team leader who would also be responsible for accounting. The success of many of the expeditionary team’s political efforts will depend on the ability to take advantage of often fleeting opportunities, the nature and extent of which cannot be anticipated in advance. For this the contingency fund is essential.

In addition to some of the activities previously discussed, other initiatives which might require using the contingency fund could consist of supporting the writing and publication of prodemocratic think pieces as well as various media materials and radio, TV, and film scripts. Visits by recognized experts with relevant experiences in difficult democratic transitions in other countries could be facilitated. Likewise, some initial actions of various NGOs in support of civil society could be supported with contingency funds. This could be followed as warranted by more regular assistance from the National Endowment for Democracy and from more regular State and USAID resources.

The special security requirements of the expeditionary team will be addressed. Again the approach will be on risk management not risk avoidance. While the main office for the team will necessarily be located in the regular embassy compound, team operations would be facilitated by locating its living quarters and a field office outside the compound. If there is a small SOF or other military advisory team in operation, the expeditionary team could co-locate within its compound for perimeter security purposes. The expeditionary team leader would be assigned a personal security assistant whose job would be to develop a special security plan for the team. This could involve hiring local security personnel to serve as bodyguards. The local CIA station could help with the vetting.

It is also suggested that the principal US military advisor should have an operational fund (similar to the commander’s fund in use in Afghanistan) that he or she could use with appropriate
guidelines. This officer would be accountable up the military chain of command, but would coordinate the purpose and nature of the proposed expenditures with the expeditionary team leader.

Additional Missions and Actions

Over the longer term, an additional mission of the expeditionary team is to foster the development of effective and democratically oriented indigenous leaders. This can be done delicately through personal advice given over an extended period of time but is absolutely dependent on factors of trust and confidence. NGO support could also be arranged for specific leaders and movements. Local media can be persuaded to cover the actions of good leaders, and international private and public organizations that work with, award, or help to train these leaders could be encouraged to do so. Government leaders who demonstrate unselfish service or who adopt nontraditional ways of exerting leadership—by, for example, making personal unannounced inspections of his or her ministry’s operations—could become material for media coverage. Meanwhile, expeditionary officers should continually be suggesting ways in which civil society and government leaders can become outstanding examples of what democratic leadership means.

Conclusions

This overview description is intended to provide an idea of how an expeditionary team might operate in a vulnerable country. Obviously there would be additional complications to deal with, problems to overcome, and other opportunities to be taken advantage of. There will be setbacks as well as steps forward and progress is unlikely to be immediately evident. Many of the efforts and actions previously described may appear short term in nature. But to have their desired impact, expeditionary officers and a steady level of modest US assistance must continue over the longer term. Expeditionary officers must serve longer terms than normal State Department rotation provides. To achieve a reasonable degree of success, Washington’s support for the expeditionary effort cannot be provided on a short-term basis or against an artificial deadline imposed for domestic political reasons. A case in point is El Salvador, which took 12 years for an internal conflict to be resolved through military and political means and for a reasonable degree of democratic stability to be established.
TWO-YEAR BUDGET
Year ONE Budget Estimate for Expeditionary Force

**Expeditionary Team Members**

45 staff years CONUS @ $150,000 $6,750,000

**Headquarters Faculty and Personnel**

5 senior staff & 6* faculty (1.2 years) @ $200,000 $2,640,000
10 administrative support staff (1.2 years) @ $75,000 $900,000

**Direct Costs - Headquarters**

5000 sq ft office space @ $40/sq ft $200,000
Equipment, materials, supplies $1,000,000
Recruitment and screening costs $200,000
Travel costs for director and staff $100,000

**Direct Costs - Training**

NDU space and support @ 3,000 per participant x 80 $240,000
Training materials @ $1,000 x 80 $80,000
Training participant TDY costs 30** x $130 per diem x 360 days $1,684,800
Outside faculty (120 days @$550, plus $200 per diem, plus 40 trips @ $1000 $130,000
Training participant transportation @ $5,000 x 64 $320,000
FSI language costs - 16 x $100 x 270 days $432,000
Orientation course chiefs /deputy chiefs of mission $100,000

Subtotal $14,776,800
8% contingency $1,182,144
TOTAL Year One $15,958,944

Note: *Faculty includes one psychologist
** 50% of training participants are on TDY
Year TWO Budget Estimate for Expeditionary Force

**Expeditionary Team Members**

- 45 staff years @ $600,000 $27,000,000
- 27 staff years @ $153,000 $4,131,000

Team administrative personnel, 3 per team x 12 staff years @ $400,000 $4,800,000
Team security expert, 1 per team x 4 staff years @ $600,000 $2,400,000

**Operational Fund**

- $6 million average for 8 countries x 60% $28,800,000
- Transportation costs for overseas team/admin 96 @ $15,000 $1,440,000

**Headquarters Faculty and Personnel**

- 8 senior staff and 6 faculty* @ $204,000 $2,856,000
- 15 administrative support staff @ $77,000 $1,155,000

**Direct Costs - Headquarters**

- 5000 sq ft office space @ $44/sq ft $220,000
- Equipment, materials, and supplies $400,000
- Recruitment and screening costs $220,000
- Travel for director and staff $300,000

**Direct Costs - Training**

Year One subtotal @ $2,554,800 x 1.1 $2,810,280

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**TOTAL TWO-YEAR BUDGET** $98,613,806